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This thesis seeks to understand the internal motivations driving some Latin American 
countries to pursue space programs, how these programs interact at the regional level, 
and how countries with more developed space capabilities influence these efforts. This 
thesis also provides insight on the following questions: What obstacles have impeded the 
development of Latin American space capabilities thus far, and what are the prospects for 
future regional and international cooperation? 
This thesis finds that domestic politics matter most when determining the regional 
and international orientation of these space programs. Domestically, the desire to develop 
economically is the fundamental driver. While the era of military rule encouraged 
geopolitical competition among some of these programs, this faded after the return to 
democracy. Space now competes poorly with other social and developmental priorities 
due to a lack of electoral incentives for politicians. International collaboration is 
restricted by nuclear and missile nonproliferation regimes. U.S. export control regulations 
limit the scope of potential projects that might have otherwise been accommodated by 
domestic politics, driving Latin American space programs to seek other international 
partners. The thesis concludes with recommendations for increasing U.S. engagement 
with these programs. 
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This thesis seeks to understand the internal motivations driving some Latin 
American countries to pursue space programs, how these programs interact at the 
regional level, and how countries with more developed space capabilities influence these 
efforts. In addition to understanding the motivations behind Latin American space 
programs, this thesis also seeks to shed light on the following questions: What obstacles 
have impeded the development of Latin American space capabilities thus far, and what 
are the prospects for future multilateral regional and international cooperation?  
While developed nations continue to dominate space technology development, 
more developing nations are seeking to acquire space capabilities, as evidenced by the 
rapid recent proliferation of national space programs. From 1950 to 2000, the world went 
from having no space programs or capabilities to having 48 civilian space agencies, with 
37 countries possessing the ability to operate satellites, and nine countries achieving 
domestic satellite launch capabilities.1 In 2009, 23 of the top 25 countries with the largest 
economies as ranked by gross domestic product (GDP) had national space programs.2 In 
Central and South America, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, 
Mexico, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela have established official space programs, while 
French Guyana provides Europe with equatorial launch facilities. 
According to estimates made by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD), the investment of roughly $200 billion in space programs 
worldwide from 1996 to 2005 reaped roughly $500 billion in revenues for the space value 
chain and an estimated $700 billion in benefits to society (in the form of efficiencies and 
                                                 
1 Bryan R. Early, “Exploring the Final Frontier: An Empirical Analysis of Global Civil Space 
Proliferation,” International Studies Quarterly 58, no. 1 (March 1, 2014): 61, doi:10.1111/isqu.12102. 
2 Robert C. Harding, “Space Policy in Latin America: The Final Frontier of Development and 




cost avoidances).3 It is understandable that developing countries would like to secure a 
larger share of these direct and indirect benefits for themselves; however, the start-up 
costs for domestic space capabilities are considerable. These costs include not only the 
development of space hardware and ground infrastructure, but also the investment in 
human capital required to support space operations. These costs constrain the 
development strategies for Latin American countries at the domestic level. 
On the regional level, space development in Latin America initially followed a 
dual civilian-military strategy, similar to developing nations in other regions of the world; 
however, Latin America has a much different regional and international dynamic. For 
example, the intense competition that characterizes space development between Asian 
countries no longer exists in Latin America. Understanding the circumstances unique to 
Latin America can help account for the differences in development strategies and the 
slower pace of development. 
At the international level, Latin American countries are also eager to reduce their 
reliance on great powers. There is still a widespread belief among many in Central and 
South America that their lack of development is due to interference from the developed 
world, specifically the United States. This belief finds some support in space 
development. For example, the United States played an active role in blocking the 
transfer of missile technology to the Brazil during the Cold War.4 U.S. export restrictions 
have limited U.S. collaboration on space projects in Latin America, motivating the region 
to look for partners elsewhere, including China and Russia.5 But these relations have not 
always been easy or smooth for Latin American nations. Understanding the international 
aspirations of Latin America, along with its relationship to the United States and outside 
powers can also help explain the slower pace of space development. 
                                                 
3 OECD, The Space Economy at a Glance 2011 (Paris, France: OECD Publishing, 2011), 28, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264111790-en. 
4 Wendy Hunter, “The Brazilian Military after the Cold War: In Search of a Mission,” Studies in 
Comparative International Development 28, no. 4 (1994): 39, 
http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/BF02687126. 
5 Johanna Mendelson Forman, Vincent G. Sabathier, and Ashley Bander, Toward the Heavens: Latin 
America’s Emerging Space Programs (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 
2009), 8. 
 3 
B. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESIS 
Although relatively free from major conflict between states, Latin American 
countries are continually plagued by internal violence. In response to this internal 
violence, Latin American militaries have an increasingly institutionalized focus on 
internal, rather than external, security (e.g., Brazil and Mexico).6 This thesis hypothesizes 
that economic development has always been the fundamental motivation of Latin 
American space programs; however, many countries that experienced military 
dictatorships during the latter half of the twentieth century also engaged in geopolitical 
competition. Countries that had active space programs during this period imparted this 
this geopolitical focus to their programs; however, this focus faded during the widespread 
transition from authoritarianism to democracy during the 1980s. Although Latin 
American countries view space as an important avenue of economic development, space 
projects must compete with internal security and social welfare projects for funding in a 
democracy. 
The transition to democracy also influenced the regional focus of space 
development. During the period of military dictatorships, Brazil and Argentina engaged 
in a nuclear weapon and ballistic missile arms race; however, after the end of the Cold 
War, nuclear competition was replaced with cooperation with the signing of the Foz do 
Iguaçu Declaration on 12 December 1991, creating the Agência Brasileiro-Argentina de 
Contabilidade e Controle de Materiais Nucleares (Brazilian-Argentine Agency for the 
Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials [ABACC]).7 Other examples of regional 
cooperation include the Organization of American States (OAS) and the Common Market 
of the South (MERCOSUR). 
                                                 
6 Jorge Zaverucha, “Fragile Democracy and the Militarization of Public Safety in Brazil,” Latin 
American Perspectives 27, no. 3 (May 1, 2000): 8, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2634079; Arturo C. 
Sotomayor, “Militarization in Mexico and Its Implications,” in The State and Security in Mexico: 
Transformation and Crisis in Regional Perspective, ed. Brian J Bow and Arturo Santa Cruz (New York: 
Routledge, 2013), 42. 
7 Arie Marcelo Kacowicz, Zones of Peace in the Third World: South America and West Africa in 
Comparative Perspective, SUNY Series in Global Politics (Albany, NY: State University of New York 
Press, 1998), 85. 
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To date, Latin American nations have not formed a multilateral space agency 
analogous to the European Space Agency (ESA). The natural choice to lead a Latin 
American space agency is Brazil. As Susan Gratius argues, Brazil, lacking nuclear 
weapons, “is a soft power committed to civic values such as peace, democracy, and 
integration or cooperation among states.”8 Yet, such an agency was proposed as early as 
1991, but it was opposed by Brazil, a stance it would reverse later.9 Most recently, in 
December of 2013, Brazil proposed the formation of the Latin American Alliance of 
Space Agencies (ALAS).10 One possible explanation for this reversal is that Brazil’s 
stance is not only tied to its evolving aspirations for “cooperative hegemony” in the 
region, but its stance is also coupled with progress or setbacks suffered in its international 
outreach in space.11 The lack of cooperation among Latin American nations may also 
contribute the overall slower pace of space development. 
International forces strongly influence Latin American space programs. First, 
these fledgling programs rely heavily on expertise from developed nations, especially the 
pioneers of space technology. As James Clay Moltz argues, all late-developing space 
programs share this challenge.12 In the absence of strong U.S. collaboration, Latin 
American space programs have reached out to China, India, Russia, and Ukraine. China, 
in particular, has cooperated on satellite development with Brazil and Venezuela.13 Thus, 
this thesis proposes that Latin American space programs face similar challenges and 
benefits that other late-developing nations experience, and that outreach to traditional 
U.S. rivals is as much motivated by necessity as by any potential anti-American 
                                                 
8 Susanne Gratius, Brazil in the Americas: A Regional Peace Broker? (Madrid, Spain: Fundación para 
las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior, 2007), 24, 
http://www.plataformademocratica.org/Publicacoes/4656_Cached.pdf. 
9 Harding, “Space Policy in Latin America,” 183. 
10 Doug Messier, “Brazil Proposes Latin American Space Alliance at Parabolic Arc,” accessed April 
4, 2014, http://www.parabolicarc.com/2013/11/17/brazil-proposes-latin-american-space-alliance/. 
11 Gratius, Brazil in the Americas, 24. 
12 James Clay Moltz, Asia’s Space Race: National Motivations, Regional Rivalries, and International 
Risks (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2012), 23. 
13 Yun Zhao, “The 2002 Space Cooperation Protocol between China and Brazil: An Excellent 
Example of South–South Cooperation,” Space Policy 21, no. 3 (August 2005): 213–19, 
doi:10.1016/j.spacepol.2005.05.003; R. Acevedo et al., “Space Activities in the Bolivarian Republic of 
Venezuela,” Space Policy 27, no. 3 (August 2011): 174–79, doi:10.1016/j.spacepol.2011.02.003. 
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sentiment. Additionally, non-U.S. space patrons also have their own interests and 
limitations, causing some of these efforts in Latin America to encounter problems. 
Second, international nuclear and missile nonproliferation regimes have also 
hindered space development in Latin America. The United States’ strict adherence to 
export control can be traced, in part, to the short-lived arms race between Brazil and 
Argentina during the period of military rule in both countries. Consequently, Latin 
American countries must clearly demonstrate their peaceful intentions for dual-use 
technology to the United States. For example, in response to the lingering U.S. doubts 
about the military applications of its space program, Brazil joined the Missile Technology 
Control Regime (MTCR) and created a civilian space agency.14 
Finally, Latin American progress in space is hindered by failed or strained 
international collaborations. As an example, the Brazilian Space Agency (AEB) entered 
into an agreement with the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) to 
provide flight hardware for the International Space Station (ISS). The AEB failed to live 
up to this agreement due to domestic coordination and funding problems.15 Thus, internal 
instability limits future international collaborations. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Not surprisingly, a vast field of literature exists treating the space policies and 
ambitions of great powers and developed nations. In contrast, very little has been written 
about Latin American space programs, which are typically grouped with other space 
programs in the developing world. Even then, much of what is written about Latin 
American space programs tends to focus almost exclusively on Brazil, which has the 
most developed program of Latin America. References to smaller individual Latin 
American programs occur only sporadically throughout the literature. 
                                                 
14 Darly Henriques da Silva, “Brazilian Participation in the International Space Station (ISS) Program: 
Commitment or Bargain Struck?,” Space Policy, Brazilian Participation in the International Space Station 
Program, 21, no. 1 (February 2005): 59, doi:10.1016/j.spacepol.2004.11.006; Victor Zaborsky, “The 
Brazilian Export Control System,” The Nonproliferation Review 10, no. 2 (2003): 128, 
doi:10.1080/10736700308436937. 
15 Otavio Durão, “Planning and Strategic Orientations of the Brazilian Space Program,” in Space 
Strategy in the 21st Century: Theory and Policy, ed. Eligar Sadeh (New York, NY: Routledge, 2013), 342. 
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This thesis expands on the work of Robert Newberry and Robert Harding, the 
only two authors who have examined the motivations of Latin American space programs 
as a group, to date.16 Two large issues emerge from their research. First, how should the 
space ambitions of Latin American countries be interpreted from an international 
relations perspective? Both authors view space programs from the realist paradigm of 
international relations, which leads to the second issue: how does one assess the 
contribution of a space program to national power? Each author attempts to classify Latin 
American space programs based on capabilities. 
Robert Newberry analyzes Latin American space programs from a U.S.-centric 
point of view, considering the potential threats Latin American space programs pose to 
U.S. interests in the Western Hemisphere. He acknowledges that the denial of missile 
technology to the region by the United States drove these countries to seek partners 
elsewhere. Consequently, he argues that the United States should collaborate more 
openly with Latin American space programs to counteract the growing influence of China 
in the region; however, he still classifies programs with strong ties to China as 
competitors to U.S. interests.17 He does not discuss the aspirations of each program in a 
regional or international framework, aside from identifying alignment with the United 
States or its rivals. 
Newberry classifies the capabilities of Latin American space programs based on a 
three-tiered system. At the top (level 3) he places “countries with a mature space program 
and an indigenous capability to own or operate space systems…and technical capability 
to develop spacecraft hardware;” however, these countries do not possess a domestic 
satellite launch capability, or the ability to fabricate “large-scale” satellite systems.18 In 
level 2, Newberry includes “countries that have the research capabilities and intellectual 
                                                 
16 Robert D. Newberry, “Latin American Countries with Space Programs: Colleagues or 
Competitors?,” Air and Space Power Journal 17, no. 3 (Fall 2003): 39–48, 
http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj03/fal03/newberry.html; Harding, “Space Policy 
in Latin America.” 
17 Newberry, “Latin American Countries with Space Programs.” 
18 Ibid. 
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capital needed…to contribute design ideas and some hardware to a space program.”19 
Finally, at level 1 are countries “that are willing participants in other space programs and 
that can contribute either intellectual or financial resources to a collaborative venture with 
another space-faring country.”20 While these levels make sense for the rough sketches 
Newberry gives, they are too vague for a detailed comparison between programs. He 
does not define what constitutes a mature space program, nor the dividing line between 
large-scale and small-scale satellites. Overall, these categories fail to link the capabilities 
of a space program to national power. 
Newberry’s work established the foundation for Robert Harding’s follow-up work 
on Latin American space programs. In his analysis, Harding uses the same classification 
system as Newberry but adds an international framework. He argues that space 
capabilities have become an indicator of national power in the international community, a 
realist point of view. He concludes: “Latin America’s states have pursued space-related 
programs…for the same reasons as their developed world counterparts—to further their 
national security and development agendas.”21 This blanket comparison masks some 
important distinctions. First, realist theories assume that states react to the anarchical 
international environment independent of the domestic politics within the state. For many 
Latin American states, the opposite is true—internal politics are sometimes more 
anarchic than the international environment.22 Second, even during the era of military 
dictatorship, Latin American states had a strong tradition of participation in regional and 
international organizations and adherence to norms.23 Finally, only Brazil and Argentina 
experienced what could be termed an arms race, at least in the modern era. Other Latin 
American space programs established peaceful goals from the beginning. Thus, realism 
                                                 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Harding, “Space Policy in Latin America,” 184. 
22 Stephanie G. Neuman, “International Relations and the Third World: An Oxymoron?,” in 
International Relations Theory and the Third World, ed. Stephanie G. Neuman, 1st ed (New York: St. 
Martin’s Press, 1998), 3. 
23 Arie Marcelo Kacowicz, The Impact of Norms in International Society: The Latin American 
Experience, 1881–2001 (Notre Dame, ID: University of Notre Dame Press, 2005), 43. 
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may not offer a complete or especially useful description of the motivations behind Latin 
American space programs. 
Harding extends his work on Latin America to analyze all space programs in the 
developing world, modifying Newberry’s three-tiered classification system to make a 
clearer connection to national power. Inverting Newberry’s levels, he defines “first tier” 
developing states as follows: 
The most advanced space actors in the developing world…have achieved 
the capability to autonomously produce space technology, have developed 
(or are on the cusp of developing) indigenous launch capability for both 
orbital and geosynchronous satellite placement, and have national space 
agencies, and whose space programs evolved from the development (or 
attempted development) of ballistic missile and nuclear programs.24 
This level corresponds to Newberry’s “level 3” countries. While this definition makes 
clearer stipulations of capabilities, it does not create a solid foundation for making 
comparisons between the programs of each country. First, Harding classifies Brazil, 
China, and India as the only first tier developing states. While China and India may be 
classified as a developing nations based on GDP, their space capabilities are far ahead of 
Brazil. Second, the stipulation of nuclear and ballistic missile pursuits is arbitrary. Given 
the current nonproliferation regimes, developing nations are strongly discouraged from 
pursuing both nuclear power and ballistic missile programs simultaneously. Thus, this 
technical path may be closed to future developing nations that meet all the other criteria 
for first-tier status. Also, not all states that pursue these technologies achieve them, like 
Brazil. This leads to the third point: classifying Brazil as a first-tier developing space 
power under this definition is dubious. The stipulation of being “on the cusp” of 
developing satellite launch capability seems designed to allow Brazil into this group. 
Brazil does not possess nuclear weapons or ballistic missiles, and its progress on 
developing indigenous satellite launch capabilities has stalled. Thus, the connection 
between national power and the classification of a first-tier state is lost due to the large 
disparities in capabilities among the group.  
                                                 
24 Robert C. Harding, Space Policy in Developing Countries: The Search for Security and 
Development on the Final Frontier (New York, NY: Routledge, 2012), 78–79. 
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Brazil has more in common with what Harding classifies as “second-tier” 
developing states: “those that produce some of their own technology, have basic launch 
capacity (typically sounding rockets), have national space agencies, and frequently, out of 
necessity, collaborate with more advanced states’ programs.”25 All other Latin American 
space programs are classified as “third-tier” developing states (corresponding to 
Newberry’s “level 1”), which “occasionally make contributions in space-related 
technology, almost always purchase space-related technology from more advanced 
producers, and almost always collaborate with other more developed space actors.”26 
Harding still maintains that realism provides the best framework for 
understanding the motivations of developing nations to invest in space programs. While 
he acknowledges that “liberalism enlightens our understanding of some of the events of 
the waning years of the Cold War as well as the immediate post-Cold War period,” he 
asserts that “even when states undertake space projects that are presumably cooperative 
in nature, the true intention is normally to further…political, strategic, and economic 
goals…and not necessarily to promote the ‘good of all mankind.’”27 While it is 
undoubtedly true that nations seek mutual benefits from cooperation, it misses the point 
of cooperation in the liberal international relations paradigm. As Keohane and Nye argue, 
as countries cooperate they become more interdependent, reducing the chances for 
military conflict.28 Countries with large internal problems are motivated to avoid external 
conflicts. 
Harding further discounts the other international relations schools by asserting 
that “in the near term, the cooperative, conflict-free use of space seems unlikely because 
national space policies, particularly of the larger, more capable states, have been almost 
exclusively fashioned according to the tenets of realist competition.”29 This view seems 
overly deterministic given the near-term incentives that great powers have to cooperate to 
                                                 
25 Ibid., 79. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid., 20, 28. 
28 Robert O Keohane and Joseph S Nye, Power and Interdependence (New York, NY: Longman, 
2001), 212. 
29 Harding, Space Policy in Developing Countries, 28. 
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preserve space as a viable commercial domain. Moltz argues that due to the fragility of 
the space environment—the actions of a single space-faring nation can fill the orbital 
environment with destructive debris ruining it for all—great space powers have a strong 
incentive to limit military competition in space.30 
Cooperation in space is another large issue in the literature on Latin American 
space programs. Common themes include the lack of U.S. cooperation, the influence of 
other space actors in the region (Russia, China, and India), and new possibilities for 
regional cooperation. A report issued by the Center for Strategic and International Studies 
echoes Newberry’s assertion that the United States should reassert its leadership in the 
region by collaborating with these space programs.31 The authors argue that engaging in 
Latin American space projects would provide an avenue for the United States to repair its 
poor image in the region and gain traction on other security issues in the region (the 
authors do not specify which security issues).32 Latin America, in turn, would benefit 
from greater access to remote sensing technologies critical to monitoring the health of the 
Amazon River Basin.33 
In view of the inroads made by China and Russia, the authors Ajey Lele and Ciro 
Yepes argue that India could also benefit by increasing its technical engagement in the 
region.34 As India contemplates privatizing its space launch industry, the authors envision 
an opportunity for Latin America countries to invest in Indian space launch companies as 
a way of securing these technologies for themselves.35 India’s motivations for such a 
collaboration with Latin America, while potentially mutually beneficial, would also aid 
India’s regional competition with Pakistan’s, and especially, China’s space programs. 
This is a perfect example of the underlying realist motivations that Harding asserts is 
                                                 
30 James Clay Moltz, The Politics of Space Security: Strategic Restraint and the Pursuit of National 
Interests, 2nd ed (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011), 5–7. 
31 Forman, Sabathier, and Bander, Toward the Heavens, 7. 
32 Ibid., 9. 
33 Ibid., 8. 
34 Ajey Lele and Ciro Arévalo Yepes, “Prospects and Opportunities for Space Collaboration with 




behind any collaboration in space, but it raises an important question. Why might India 
prefer collaborating with Latin America, instead of breaking down the barriers preventing 
collaboration with China? 
Lele and Yepes point out that India and Latin America not only share a heritage 
of colonialism and underdevelopment, but also share “a core set of values—a democracy, 
market economy, and a strong urge for development by imbibing best practices.”36 
Furthermore, the authors point to the contributions both Latin America and India made to 
United Nations (UN) outer space treaties and agreements, in particular the UN 
Declaration in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space for the Benefit and in the Interest 
of All States, Taking into Particular Account the Needs of Developing Countries.37 Given 
these commonalities, the authors are confident that India and Latin American countries 
can overcome the obstacles of language and geographic distance that have impeded 
collaboration.38  
China succeeded in overcoming these barriers to collaborate with Latin America. 
The China–Brazil Earth Resource Satellite (CBERS) and Venezuela’s VENESAT-1 are 
two successful cases of Latin American collaboration with China. Yun Zhao argues that 
the 2002 protocol established between China and Brazil, emphasizing cooperation on 
modest scale projects with peaceful purposes, should serve as a model for other 
developing nations.39 Likewise, R. Acevedo, of the Bolivarian Agency for Space 
Activities, highlights the fruits of Chinese collaboration with China on Venezuela’s first 
communications satellite: 30 doctorate-level space professionals and 60 satellite ground 
operators trained, two ground stations constructed, and the successful launch and 
operation of the satellite.40 
While China’s motivations may be passed off as purely self-interested by the 
realist school of international relations, Laura Delgado-López argues that, in choosing to 
                                                 
36 Ibid., 191. 
37 Ibid., 194. 
38 Ibid., 195. 
39 Zhao, “The 2002 Space Cooperation Protocol between China and Brazil,” 217. 
40 Acevedo et al., “Space Activities in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela,” 176–77. 
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cooperate in space, Brazil, China, and Venezuela “are making decisions by weighing 
costs and benefits from the perspective of their domestic and international policies.”41 
She concludes “that failing to consider the interest and constraints of the Latin American 
countries, and only evaluating the relationship from the perspective of China and the 
USA, paints an incomplete picture that does not account for the country-by-country 
variances.”42  
Otavio Durão, however, points out that cooperation can also have a downside. 
Speaking of the CBERS program, he notes that “Brazilian budgetary problems, along 
with unpredictable cash flows” required China to step up its contributions to the program, 
while Brazil suffered from international disapproval by cooperating with China.43 He 
predicts these tensions will reduce the scope of Sino-Brazilian cooperation in the future. 
Since his writing, the launch of the CBERS-3 satellite failed, resulting in the loss of the 
satellite.44 The future of the program beyond CBERS-4 is uncertain.45 
Durão also points to the failed U.S.-Brazilian International Space Station (ISS) 
collaboration as a source of continuing tension. Analyzing this failure, Darly Henriques 
da Silva argues that the U.S. decision to invite Brazil to participate in the ISS program 
and Brazil acceptance were based on domestic political concerns, and not technical 
competence.46 Brazil had little interest in the ISS itself—its main concern was making its 
Alcântara Launch Center profitable and sought an agreement that would allow U.S. firms 
to use the facility.47 The United States saw an opportunity to improve U.S.-Brazilian 
                                                 
41 Laura M. Delgado-López, “Sino-Latin American Space Cooperation: A Smart Move,” Space Policy 
28, no. 1 (February 2012): 7, doi:10.1016/j.spacepol.2011.12.009. 
42 Ibid., 13. 
43 Durão, “Planning and Strategic Orientations,” 340–41. 
44 Instituto Nacional de Pesquisas Espaciais, “Ciência Sem Fronteiras Terá Bolsas Específicas Para a 
Área Espacial [Science Without Borders Will Have Specific Scholarships for Space],” July 25, 2013, 
http://www.inpe.br/noticias/noticia.php?Cod_Noticia=3344. 
45 Instituto Nacional de Pesquisas Espaciais, “Brasil E China Lançam Satélite Em Dezembro E 
Apostam Na Continuidade Do Programa CBERS [Brazil and China Launch Satellite in December and Bet 
on the Continuity of the CBERS Program],” accessed October 10, 2014, 
http://www.cbers.inpe.br/noticia.php?Cod_Noticia=3698. 
46 Silva, “Brazilian Participation in the International Space Station (ISS) Program,” 59. 
47 Ibid., 57. 
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relations in pursuit of establishing the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), a 
multilateral free trade agreement for the Western Hemisphere, while shoring up further 
support for the ISS.48 Silva argues that both sides share blame for failing to match 
domestic ambitions with foreign policy. 
In summary, the work of Robert Newberry and Robert Harding treats Latin 
American space programs from the realist point of view; however, their classification 
systems do not adequately address how space capabilities translate into national power. 
Furthermore, viewing these programs from a purely realist perspective misses the strong 
connection of Latin American domestic politics to foreign policy. Domestic politics 
shape the nature of Latin American cooperation, and matching domestic priorities with 
international ambitions is key to successful collaborations on space projects. 
D. METHODS AND SOURCES 
This thesis will examine the history of Latin America’s 10 space programs 
(Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela— Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, 
Uruguay are in the appendix) to identify common themes in each, adopting the 
framework used by Moltz in his study on Asian space programs. His study “employs a 
multitiered framework beginning with domestic perspectives and national priorities for 
space, then moving to analyze regionwide interactions and trends, and finally considering 
implications at the international level.”49 Moltz places these programs within the context 
of late-developing nations and considers the degree to which technological development 
objectives, national security pressures, and the desire for international prestige drive each 
program. Finally, Moltz considers the international relations of these programs from 
realist, liberal, and constructivist points of view. 
Since a comprehensive history of each space mission in each program is beyond 
the scope of this work, the thesis will also draw on the “Space Technology Ladder” 
concept developed by Danielle Wood and Annalisa Weigel to assess the technological 
maturity of each program at key points. This assessment tool offers a 13-tiered rubric 
                                                 
48 Ibid., 58. 
49 Moltz, Asia’s Space Race, 21–22. 
 14 
starting with the creation of a governmental space office to the indigenous launch of 
geostationary satellites.50 The 13 tiers cover four main categories of space development: 
the establishment of a national space agency, the mastery of low Earth orbit (LEO) 
satellite technology, the mastery of geostationary Earth orbit (GEO) satellite technology, 
and the development of launch capability.51 The lowest level of LEO and GEO capability 
infers the nation has adequate ground station infrastructure in place. Table 1 (adapted 
from Table 6 in Wood and Weigel) shows the details of this framework. 
Table 1.   The Space Technology Ladder52 
Category Level Milestones 
Development of Launch 
Capability 
13 GEO launch capability 
12 LEO launch capability 
Mastery of GEO 
Satellite Technology 
11 Build locally 
10 Build through mutual international collaboration 
9 Build locally with outside assistance 
8 Procure 
Mastery of LEO 
Satellite Technology 
7 Build locally 
6 Build through mutual international collaboration 
5 Build locally with outside assistance 
4 Build with support in partner’s facilities 
3 Procure with training services 
Formation of National 
Space Agency 
2 Establish national space agency 
1 Establish first national space office 
 
In Table 1, “mutual international collaboration” indicates a partnership where the 
technical and financial contributions of each party are nearly equal.53 This differentiates 
this level from lower levels on the scale that represent a greater dependence on external 
expertise. While this rubric does not view space programs through a political lens, it does 
reflect the technological realities faced by late-developing space programs—the 
                                                 
50 Danielle Wood and Annalisa Weigel, “Charting the Evolution of Satellite Programs in Developing 
Countries—The Space Technology Ladder,” Space Policy 28, no. 1 (2012): 17, 
doi:http://dx.doi.org.libproxy.nps.edu/10.1016/j.spacepol.2011.11.001. 
51 Ibid., 16–17. 
52 Ibid., 17. 
53 Ibid. 
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technological tree is nearly the reverse of the development path followed by the United 
States and Russia.  
The Space Technology Ladder provides a compelling framework to assess the 
maturity of a space program; however, it suggests, as Wood and Weigel acknowledge, an 
evolutionary path that not all countries follow. As experience in Latin America shows, 
progress in the rubric is not strictly linear. Some countries pursue development of LEO 
and GEO technologies in parallel, leading to some ambiguity on how to classify these 
programs. Some programs also develop sounding rockets (sub-orbital) prior to talking 
LEO launchers. This framework does not capture these efforts. Nor does the framework 
capture a country’s use of data from satellites it does not operate. Also, national space 
programs differ widely in organization. Some space agencies have near cabinet-level 
status, while others are managed as sub-organization within a department or ministry. 
Some are run by the military, while others have civilian leadership. These distinctions are 
important when determining the span of control exerted by the agency over all space 
activities in a country. Furthermore a civilian-led space agency is more likely to be 
accepted by the international community, given the dual-use nature of space technology. 
To avoid these ambiguities, this study uses the overall framework provided by the ladder 
to assess the maturity of a space program, but it does not attempt to assign a country a 
specific level. Even among space programs with nearly equal technical maturity, 
differences in strategic vision and domestic economy can lead to vastly different 
outcomes in the future. 
Finally, in addition to the journal articles describing the activities of these space 
programs, this thesis will review the most recent strategic vision or roadmap documents 
published by each Latin American space program, as well as reports from regional and 
international organizations, current newspapers, trade journals, and other relevant 
commentary. 
E. THESIS OVERVIEW 
Chapter II uses the experience of the Brazilian space program to introduce key 
themes useful for understanding Latin America as a region, as well as its relationship 
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with the United States and the rest of the world. Argentina, Brazil’s technological peer, 
could also have been chosen for this purpose; however, the activities of the Argentine 
space program are not as widely covered in the English scholarly literature, and the 
Spanish literature is difficult to obtain. 
Chapter III reviews the history of the space programs of Argentina, Chile, 
Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Uruguay are covered in 
the appendix). The chapter then discusses the themes that emerged from these descriptive 
histories and concludes by assessing their progress on the Space Technology Ladder. 
Chapter IV concludes this thesis by examining what the United States can do to 




II. THE BRAZILIAN SPACE PROGRAM 
The experience of Brazil’s space program illustrates several key themes useful not 
only for understanding other space programs in the region, but Latin America itself. First, 
the desire to develop economically is the fundamental motivation of Brazil’s space 
program. While it is true that Argentina and Brazil nearly triggered an arms race during 
the era of military rule, geopolitical competition faded quickly after the return to 
democracy. Second, domestic politics matter most when determining the regional and 
international orientation of these space programs. Domestic politics influence everything 
from economic policy to the specific choice of collaboration partners. Finally, 
international forces, including international nuclear and missile nonproliferation regimes, 
also influence these space programs. 
This chapter first examines the institutions that currently form the structure of 
Brazilian space efforts. With this framework in place, this chapter then traces the history 
of the Brazilian space program in three parts: from its origins in 1957 to formation of the 
Brazilian Complete Space Mission (MECB) in 1979, from the MECB to the formation of 
the Brazilian Space Agency (AEB) in 1994, and from the AEB to the present. After 
discussing the history of the program, this chapter concludes by discussing the strategic 
orientation of the program both domestically and internationally. 
A. THE STRUCTURE OF THE BRAZILIAN SPACE PROGRAM 
More so than any other space program in Latin America, the Brazilian space 
program is characterized by a complex web of civilian and military institutions that have 
evolved since the late 1950s. Understanding the current structure of the Brazilian space 
program provides the framework for tracing its trajectory through time. Figure 1 shows 
an organizational diagram of the key institutions of the Brazilian space program. The 
Presidência da República (President of Brazil) directs the space program primarily 
through the Ministério da Defesa (Ministry of Defense [MD]) and the Ministério da 
Ciência, Tecnologia e Inovação (Ministry of Science, Technology, and Innovation 
[MCTI]). The Agência Espacial Brazileira (Brazilian Space Agency [AEB]) is linked to 
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the MCTI but coordinates space activities across all other governmental ministries. The 
Sistema Nacional de Desenvolvimento das Atividades Espaciais (National System for the 
Development of Space Activities [SINDAE]) established in 1996 formalized the 
relationships between these institutions and their sub-organizations.54 The next sections 
discuss the MCTI and MD in more detail. 
  
Figure 1.  The structure of the Brazilian space program.55 
1. The Ministry of Science, Technology, and Innovation 
The MCTI was founded in 1985 after the transition to democracy. Originally 
named the Ministry of Science and Technology, the ministry added “Innovation” to its 
title in 2011.56 The MCTI combined the activities of the Financiadora de Estudos e 
Projetos (literally translated “Financier of Studies and Projects” [Finep]) and the 
Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico (National Council of 
Technological and Scientific Development [CNPq]) under one umbrella organization. 
Historically, these organizations formed the primary means whereby Brazil nurtured the 
                                                 
54 Agência Espacial Brasileira, Programa Nacional de Actividades Espacias: 2005–2014 [National 
Program of Space Activities: 2005–2014] (Brasília, Brazil: Ministério da Ciência e Tecnologia, 2005), 109. 
55 Agência Espacial Brasileira, “Política Espacial [Space Policy],” accessed September 24, 2014, 
http://www.aeb.gov.br/programa-espacial/politica-espacial/. 
56 Ministério da Ciência, Tecnologia e Inovação, “Perguntas Frequentes [Frequently Asked 
Questions],” accessed September 24, 2014, http://www.mcti.gov.br/perguntas-frequentes#titulo3. 
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development of scientific and technical capacity. The CNPq helped initiate Brazil’s first 
steps to forming a space agency.  
Today, the MCTI directly controls the activities of the Instituto Nacional de 
Pesquisas Espaciais (National Institute of Space Studies [INPE]) through the 
Subsecretaria de Coordenação das Unidades de Pesquisa (literally translated Sub-
secretariat of Research Unit Coordination, SCUP). INPE is the offspring of the Brazil’s 
first organizing committee for space, the Grupo de Organização da Comissão Nacional 
de Atividades Espaciais (Organizing Group for the National Commission on Space 
Activities [GOCNAE]) formed in 1961.57 The primary mission of INPE is the 
development of technology, often satellites, to support Earth and space research.58 INPE 
participated in the successful collaboration with China on the China-Brazil Earth 
Resources Satellite (CBERS) Program. INPE also runs the Laboratório de Integração e 
Testes (Integration and Testing Laboratory [LIT]), which performs the systems 
integration and operational testing of satellites and other space instruments or 
components.59 
The MCTI is also formally linked to two autonomous organizations, the AEB and 
Alcântara Cyclone Space (ACS). Formed in 1994, the AEB marked the official transition 
to a civilian-led space program. Although the president of the AEB reports directly to the 
President of Brazil, the AEB, like NASA, is not a cabinet-level organization.60 The 
Conselho Superior, or Board, of the AEB unites representatives from every Brazilian 
ministry, the Brazilian National Security Council, every military service, Finep, and 
CNPq to create Brazilian space policy. The AEB expresses this policy in the Programa 
Nacional de Atividades Espaciais (National Program of Space Activities [PNAE]), which 
                                                 
57 Instituto Nacional de Pesquisas Espaciais, “História [History],” accessed September 24, 2014, 
http://www.inpe.br/institucional/sobre_inpe/historia.php. 
58 Instituto Nacional de Pesquisas Espaciais, “Missão, Visão E Valores [Mission, Vision, Values],” 
accessed September 24, 2014, http://www.inpe.br/institucional/sobre_inpe/missao.php. 
59 Durão, “Planning and Strategic Orientations,” 336. 
60 Brian Harvey, Henk H. F. Smid, and Théo Pirard, Emerging Space Powers the New Space 
Programs of Asia, the Middle East and South-America (Chichester, United Kingdom: Springer; Published 
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lays out Brazil’s vision for developing space capabilities.61 The PNAE has undergone 
four revisions. The current version the PNAE covers 2012 to 2021. The AEB Board also 
works to connect government with academia and industry to carry out the activities 
envisioned in the PNAE.  
ACS is officially classified as a binational company linked to the MCTI.62 The 
company is a joint venture between Brazil and Ukraine with the goal of using Brazil’s 
Centro de Lançamento de Alcântara (Alcântara Launch Center [CLA]) to launch 
Ukraine’s Cyclone-4 launch vehicle. The CLA is located at 2.28° south latitude, placing 
it in competition with France’s Centre Spatial Guyanais at 5.3° north latitude.63 
2. The Ministry of Defense 
The Brazilian MD is a relatively new institution, formed on 9 June 1999 during 
the administration of President Fernando Henrique Cardoso. The new ministry united the 
three major service commands (army, navy, and air force) under civilian leadership. 
Previously each service was a separate ministry. The former Ministério da Aeronáutica 
(Ministry of Aeronautics, MAER) was established in 1941 and played a key role in the 
initiation of and direction of the space program. The Comando da Aeronáutica 
(Aeronautics Command [COMAER]) currently manages all of Brazilian military efforts 
in space. 
COMAER manages the military space effort through the Departamento de 
Ciência e Technologia Aeroespacial (Department of Science and Aerospace Technology 
[DCTA]). The DCTA has its roots in the Centro Técnico Aeroespacial (Aerospace 
Technical Center [CTA]) established in 1946. Patterned in part after the U.S. Air Force’s 
Army Air Forces Engineering School and research facilities at Wright Field (now 
Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Dayton, Ohio), the CTA eventually housed the 
                                                 
61 Agência Espacial Brasileira, “Diretorias [Directories],” accessed September 24, 2014, 
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http://www.alcantaracyclonespace.com/en/about/general-infrastructure; “Europe’s Spaceport,” European 
Space Agency, accessed September 24, 2014, 
http://www.esa.int/Our_Activities/Launchers/Europe_s_Spaceport/Europe_s_Spaceport2. 
 21 
Institúto Tecnológica de Aeronáutica (Aeronautics Technological Institute [ITA]) and the 
Instituto de Pesquisas e Desenvolvimento (Institute of Research and Development 
[IPD]).64 The ITA, established in 1950, is similar to the U.S. Air Force Institute of 
Technology, but offers both undergraduate and graduate degrees in engineering 
disciplines to boost the technical expertise of the officer corps. In 1954, the CTA 
established the IPD to promote aerospace research and outreach to industry.65 
As the pace of space technology development increased, the Brazilian Air Force 
created new organizations to promote space within the Air Force. In 1961, the IPD 
created a Divisão de Atividades Espaciais (Space Activities Division [DAE]), which 
became the Instituto de Atividades Espaciais (Institute of Space Activities) in 1969. In 
1991, the IPD and the IAE merged to form the current institution, the Instituto de 
Aeronáutica e Espaço (Institute of Aeronautics and Space [IAE]).66 The IAE played a 
critical role in the development of Brazilian sounding rockets and currently manages the 
development of Brazilian satellite launch systems. 
In parallel with the activities of the IPD, the CTA also built two launch centers: 
the Centro de Lançamento da Barreira do Inferno (Barreira do Inferno Launch Center 
[CLBI]) and the CLA, mentioned previously. The CLBI, established in 1965, served as 
the center of activity for Brazilian sounding rocket operations. When it became evident 
that the site was inadequate to launch larger vehicles, the Air Force established the CLA 
in 1983.67  
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B. THE HISTORY OF THE BRAZILIAN SPACE PROGRAM 
Just as the United States struggled initially to unify the national effort in space, 
Brazilian space institutions have also evolved to work in concert with one another. This is 
evident in two key moments. First, the creation of the Missão Espacial Completa 
Brasileira (Brazilian Complete Space Mission [MECB]) in 1979 represented the first 
attempt to create a unified strategic vision for space development. Second, the 
establishment of the AEB in 1994 and the subsequent development of the PNAE mark 
the second, and ongoing, effort to align all Brazilian space activities with a central vision. 
The next sections use these events to frame the history of the Brazilian space program 
and place them in the context of the political climate of the time. 
1. From a Small Satellite Tracking Station to the MECB 
In 1957, Fernando de Mendonça and Júlio Alberto de Morais Coutinho, both Air 
Force officers attending the ITA, submitted a proposal to the U.S. Naval Research 
Laboratory (NRL) to build a satellite tracking station to monitor the upcoming U.S. 
satellite launches during the International Geophysical Year (1957-1958).68 Funded by 
the NRL and the working in conjunction with the IPD, the students successfully tracked 
the Sputnik satellite launched on 4 October 1957, as well as the Explorer-1 satellite in 
January of 1958.  
These events occurred during the administration of President Juscelino 
Kubitschek (1956-1961). President Kubitschek took office during turbulent times. In 
1954, the nationalistic President Getúlio Vargas committed suicide and the military stood 
poised to take over the government. Kubitschek prioritized economic development, 
running on the promise “50 years of development in five.”69 Brazil’s rivalry with 
Argentina, which intensified during the Vargas dictatorship and administration, spurred 
Brazil to continue its efforts to develop nuclear power. In 1951, President Vargas formed 
what eventually became CNPq, which adopted nuclear power as a top priority. During 
the Vargas administration, the United States blocked Brazil’s efforts to start a uranium 
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enrichment program with the aid of West Germany.70 Brazil cooperated with the United 
States through the Atoms for Peace program, resulting in the first nuclear research reactor 
in the southern hemisphere in 1957.71 Brazil’s nuclear ambitions would shape 
international opinion on its space program. Kubitschek continued nuclear development in 
Brazil; however, his term of office ended before space development would begin in 
earnest, but his presidency set the tone for his successor Jânio Quadros. 
Acting on the recommendations on the Inter-American Committee on Space 
Research, President Jânio Quadros created an exploratory committee to propose the way 
forward for Brazilian space policy.72 The efforts of the committee, composed of 
representatives from CNPq, CTA, IPD, and members of the scientific community, led to 
the creation of the Grupo de Organização da Comissão Nacional de Atividades Espaciais 
(Organizing Group for the National Commission on Space Activities, GOCNAE, or 
CNAE for short), which became part of CNPq. Days after officially hosting Yuri Gagarin 
in Brazil, President Quadros formally created CNAE in July 1961. Although officially a 
civilian institution, the military essentially ran CNAE. MAER made this evident when it 
provided the CNAE staff with office space in San José dos Campos, the same city where 
CTA, ITA, and INP were located.73 MAER also pursued its own space agenda, creating 
the DAE in 1961 and forming the Grupo Executivo e de Trabalhos e Estudos de Projetos 
Especiais (shortened in English to Executive Group for Space Studies and Projects 
[GETEPE]) in 1964. 
President Quadros’s very short presidency (1961) followed by his successor’s, 
President João Goulart (1961-1965), marked a shift in Brazilian foreign policy that set the 
military on edge. This new phase, dubbed política externa independente (independent 
foreign policy), reestablished diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and actively 
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sought to cultivate relationships with other developing nations, especially among recently 
formed countries after decolonization.74 Goulart’s turn towards the left, combined with 
the turmoil of the Cold War, moved the military to take action. On 31 March 1964, the 
military successfully launched a coup d’etat.75 
Notwithstanding the political turmoil, the space program pressed forward. On 15 
November 1965, CLBI launched its first sounding rocket, representing a successful 
collaboration between CNAE, MAER, and NASA.76 The launch supported NASA and 
other space researchers worldwide studying the sun during the International Quiet Sun 
Years of 1964–65. CLBI also conducted sounding rocket operations at an alternate 
launch site at Praia de Cassino (Cassino Beach) in a global effort to study the total solar 
eclipse on 12 November 1966.77 While initially dependent on foreign support to build 
rockets and payloads, Brazil successfully developed its own family of sounding rockets. 
The increasing capability of these rockets, combined with Brazil’s nuclear aspirations and 
military participation, drew the attention of U.S. nonproliferation efforts.  
Notwithstanding Brazil ratifying the Outer Space Treaty and the Treaty of 
Tlatelolco (both signed in 1967), world powers had reason to doubt Brazil’s commitment 
to nonproliferation. Although the Treaty of Tlatelolco banned nuclear weapons in Latin 
America and the Caribbean, Brazil and Argentina successfully lobbied to insert language 
into the treaty allowing for peaceful nuclear detonations.78 Furthermore, Brazil did not 
ratify the Treaty of Tlatelolco until 1994. Also in 1967, the military government 
announced its intentions to master the nuclear fuel cycle.79 The rivalry between Brazil 
and Argentina led outside observers to fear a nuclear arms race between the two.80 To 
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add further doubt, Brazil did not sign the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons (NPT) in 1968. This was an early expression of Brazil’s dissatisfaction with the 
unequal relationship encoded in the treaty between nuclear and non-nuclear states.81 
Brazil would not sign the NPT until 1998.  
Brazil’s nuclear ambitions would suffer several setbacks the 1970s as it 
negotiated with the United States for nuclear fuel for its first nuclear power plant, Angra 
1. Not only did the United States withdraw its support to provide nuclear fuel, but also it, 
along with the Soviet Union, interfered with efforts to collaborate with West Germany to 
export nuclear-fuel-cycle capability to Brazil.82 For Brazil and other developing nations, 
this pressure seemed to confirm the fundamental premise behind dependency theory—the 
idea that developed nations actively prevented the development of other nations. Brazil 
deeply resented this interference and the desire to minimize external influences in 
domestic politics drives Brazilian foreign policy to this day.83 
As the military regime pursued nuclear technology, it also continued to 
consolidate the Brazilian space effort. In 1969, the GETEPE established the Instituto de 
Atividades Espaciais, which it tasked to develop sounding rockets and orbital launch 
systems.84 In 1971, the military combined the activities of MAER and CNAE into a new 
organization, the Comissão Brasileira de Atividades Espaciais (Brazilian Commission of 
Space Activities [COBAE]).85 The chief of the Estado-Maior das Forças Armadas 
(Armed Forces General Staff) led the commission, formalizing the military control of the 
space program. This engendered for Brazil’s rocket development the same international 
suspicion that existed for its nuclear power program. In 1978, COBAE began the work to 
harmonize all of Brazil’s diverse space projects into a single vision. This vision became 
the MECB. 
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2. From the MECB to the PNAE 
In 1979, the military government approved the MECB, representing Brazil’s first 
long range plan for space. The plan called for INPE to develop four small satellites, two 
Satélite de Coleta de Dados (Data Collection Satellites, SCD) and two Satélite de 
Sensoriamento Remoto (Remote Sensing Satellites, SSR). The SCDs were designed to 
receive signals from 60 environmental monitoring ground stations scattered through 
Brazil and communicate this data to a central processing center.86 The SSRs were 
envisioned to provide Brazil with the capability of monitoring the Amazon region.87 The 
MECB tasked MAER with the development of a launch vehicle, Veículo Lançador de 
Satélites (Satellite Launch Vehicle [VLS]) and the associated infrastructure, including the 
CLA.88 As MAER and INPE embarked on the MECB, the Ministério da Marinha (Naval 
Ministry) started a secret program to develop nuclear fuel and reactor for a submarine.89 
Over the course of the next 10 years, Brazil would spend roughly R$2 trillion 
(converted to the Brazilian Real, which was not Brazil’s currency during this period) 
pursuing this vision.90 This ambitious plan reflected the economic optimism of the time. 
During the period from 1950 to 1980, Brazil experienced high rates of economic growth, 
often referred to as the “Brazilian Miracle.”91 Unfortunately, Brazil’s response to the 
world oil crisis in 1973 led to debt that would become unmanageable after interest rates 
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Antonio Fernando Bertachini de Almeida Prado (São Paulo, Brazil: Editora Livraria da Física, 2007), 174. 
87 Décio Castilho Ceballos, “The Brazilian Space Program: A Selective Strategy for Space 
Development and Business,” Space Policy 11, no. 3 (August 1995): 203, doi:10.1016/0265-
9646(95)92254-B. 
88 Ibid., 202. 
89 Kassenova, Brazil’s Nuclear Kaleidoscope, 23. 
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rose sharply in 1979. By the 1990s, Brazil’s exports fell to roughly half their 1980s 
volume.92 The economic downturn helped speed the end of the military regime. 
It is uncertain how much Argentina’s Cóndor II, an intermediate-range ballistic 
missile program, motivated Brazil’s space ambitions during the 1980s. U.S. intelligence 
revealed most of what has come to light about the Argentine program.93 Furthermore, 
Argentina’s loss to Great Britain in the Falklands (Malvinas) War in 1982 signaled the 
decline of military rule in Argentina. By 1984, civilian rule returned to Argentina, 
although it pursued the Cóndor II program until 1989, when the high costs of the program 
and U.S. pressure brought an end to the program.94 By 1985, Brazil and Argentina, now 
both under civilian rule, revealed their secret nuclear programs and signed the Joint 
Declaration on Nuclear Policy.95 This laid the foundation for the bilateral agreement 
between the two that established ABACC in 1991, and later the Quadripartite Agreement 
between Brazil, Argentina, ABACC, and the International Atomic Energy Agency. Both 
countries also signed the MTCR in 1987. 
During the early 1980s, the Ministério das Relaçoes Exteriores (Ministry of 
Foreign Relations, known as Itamaraty) lead an effort to reach out to China. In 1982, 
Brazil signed an agreement to cooperate in science and technology. After the transition to 
civilian rule, the MCTI (then the MCT) continued this outreach, leading to an agreement 
in 1988 to begin the CBERS program. In pursuing the CBERS collaboration, Itamaraty 
hoped to increase trade with China.96 The CBERS satellite would serve as a stepping-
stone for Brazil to develop the SSR. Both are imaging remote sensing missions; however, 
the continuing economic problems of Brazil would delay the launch of CBERS-1 until 
1999.  
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While the MECB focused on launch vehicles and small LEO satellites, Brazil’s 
telecommunications industry branched out into GEO satellites. The Brazilian government 
authorized Embratel, a Brazilian telecommunications company, to operate privately 
procured GEO satellites. Brasilsat A1 and Brasilsat A2, built by the Canadian Spar 
Aerospace in cooperation with Hughes, launched 1985 and 1986 respectively. To this 
day, Brazil operates ground stations for its GEO satellites, but continues to procure them 
from foreign companies.97 
Brazil returned to civilian rule in 1985. This transition, however, did not happen 
smoothly. President-elect Tancredo Neves died before taking office. His vice-president, 
José Sarney, took office in his place. Brazil’s efforts to follow International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) neoliberal guidelines failed to stabilize the Brazilian economy during the 
1980s and early 1990s. For a brief period in 1986, after the introduction of the cruzado 
monetary plan, monthly inflation dipped below 10 percent; however, inflation would 
steadily increase to a high of 80 percent per month by the end of Sarney’s term in 1989.98 
The policies of President Fernando Collor de Melo (the first president to be elected by a 
direct popular vote under Brazil’s 1988 Constitution) likewise failed to control 
hyperinflation. In 1992, the Brazilian Congress impeached President Collor for 
corruption, elevating Vice-president Itamar Franco to the presidency. During Collor’s 
brief presidency (1990–1992) the space program became more difficult to justify from a 
strategic view in comparison to the economic crisis.99 During this period Brazil’s defense 
industry, which had thrived under military rule, collapsed from its peak in 1989 with 
US$380 million in global sales to US$3 million by the mid-1990s.100 President Cardoso 
oversaw the privatization of Brazil’s state-owned, military-run aeronautics company, 
Embraer, as part of his neoliberal economic reforms.101 
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The economic downturn also hobbled progress towards the MECB objectives. 
Brazil spent approximately R$1 trillion between 1990 and 2000, roughly half of what it 
spent the previous decade.102 The MECB did produce it first fruits, however, on 9 
February 1993 with the launch of the first Data Collection Satellite, SCD-1. INPE 
contracted the Orbital Sciences Corporation in conjunction with NASA to launch SCD-1 
aboard a Pegasus launch vehicle. While not launched on a Brazilian-made booster, SCD-
1 still represents a key milestone in the Brazilian space program—the first satellite 
completely designed and built by Brazilians.103 This year marks the twenty-first year of 
continuous operations for SCD-1.104 As evidence of the success of the SCD program, the 
number of ground stations grew from 60 in 1993 to 750 by 2005.105 Hundreds of these 
platforms support the Sistema de Vigilância da Amazônia (Amazon Surveillance System 
[SIVAM]), which fuses data received from a network of sensors including ground, air, 
and space-based assets.106 SIVAM detects illegal activities such as logging and mining 
within the region, but also provides intelligence to the Brazilian military on border 
activities.107 Although tainted by allegation of corruption, SIAVAM represents a 
successful U.S.-Brazil collaboration. Brazil chose Raytheon, a U.S. company, to install 
the radars for the system. SIVAM, however, was also very expensive (US$1.395 billion 
over 20 years), siphoning funds away from launch vehicle development.108 
The last year of President Franco’s term brought some positive changes to Brazil. 
In 1994, Franco’s minister of finance, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, implemented the Real 
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Plan, which effectively halted Brazil’s hyperinflation and led to his election to the 
presidency. In addition to ending hyperinflation woes, Brazil also worked to overcome 
the military stigma attached to its space and nuclear ambitions. Although President Collor 
had already terminated the Navy’s uranium enrichment program and the Treaty of 
Tlatelolco and Quadripartite Agreement entered into to effect, Brazil had not yet ratified 
the NPT.109 Brazil also replaced CONAE with the AEB in an effort to further consolidate 
the space program and place it under civilian control.110 Under its direction, the AEB 
elaborated the second comprehensive vision for Brazil’s space program—the PNAE.  
3. From the PNAE and Beyond 
Since many of the goals of the MECB remained unrealized by 1994, the first 
PNAE (released in 1996) retained the same direction for Brazil’s space activities. The 
plan called for development in three specific areas: access to space via domestic 
launchers, satellites tailored to meet Brazil’s development needs, and the further 
development of national launch centers.111 In 1996, the Brazilian government formalized 
the relationships between the various organizations in the space program under SINDAE, 
ultimately leading to the structure seen in Figure 1. The PNAE, however, did not receive 
the same budgetary support from the civilian government that the MECB received from 
the military government. The lack of stable funding destroyed confidence among 
SINDAE organizations that the federal government was committed to achieving goals 
laid out in the PNAE.112 From 1994 to the present day, Brazil’s space program enjoyed 
several brief moments of progress along with many frustrating delays and tragic setbacks. 
The next sections trace out several activities spanning this period. 
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a. Brazilian-Chinese Cooperation in the CBERS Program 
On 14 October 1999, the first China Brazil Earth Resources Satellite, CBERS-1, 
successfully launched from China. The first two CBERS satellites represent a 30 percent 
Brazilian, 70 percent Chinese partnership for a total investment of roughly US$300 
million.113 CBERS-2 launched on 21 October 2003. These satellite provided both 
countries with the ability to monitor their environments and eliminate dependence on 
external assets, like Landsat satellites (now currently run by the United States Geological 
Survey).114 Based on the success of CBERS-1 and 2, Brazil and China renewed their 
cooperative agreement to produce CBERS-3 and 4, this time with Brazil contributing 50 
percent of the cost.115 To help bridge the gap between the operation lifetime of CBERS-2 
and the launch of CBERS-3, Brazil and China launched CBERS-2B on 19 September 
2007. This satellite was a slightly upgraded version of the previous two. CBERS-3 and 4 
included significant upgrades to the imaging cameras, boosting their resolutions to 5 
meters.116 Given the dual military and civilian utility of these images, the United States 
invoked export restrictions, limiting the availability of components for purchase and 
delaying the project.117 CBERS-3 was launched on 9 December 2013, but failed to reach 
orbit.118 CBERS-4 passed its final design review on 19 September 2014.119 On 7 
December 2014, CBERS-4 successfully launched from China’s Taiyuan space center.120 
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The future of the CBERS program is in doubt. Although the collaboration is 
considered a success, China declined to renew the collaboration for CBERS-5 and 6 in 
2009, citing Brazil’s difficulty in keeping its commitments.121 INPE, however, reported 
the formation a joint working group to explore possibilities for new Earth-observing 
satellites.122 The proposals of this group are due by the end of 2014. One thing has 
become very clear to Brazil: “with a budget five times greater than Brazil’s, China has 
advanced by leap and bounds and surpassed Brazil, emerging as future space power.”123 
b. The VLS Program 
Brazil’s efforts to develop satellites have enjoyed some success. In 1998, Brazil 
successfully launched SCD-2 aboard another Pegasus launch vehicle, continuing the 
success of the previous satellite. Although this is a success, it highlights an area where 
Brazil continues to struggle—the development of an orbital launch vehicle.  
The MECB initiated the VLS program, and each PNAE highlights its continued 
importance; however, efforts to develop the VLS have met with little success. Prior to the 
launch of SCD-2, Brazil attempted to launch SCD-2A on 2 November 1997 aboard VLS-
1 V1, the first flight attempt for the launch system. Had it been successful, it would have 
represented Brazil’s first domestic LEO satellite insertion. During this launch, one of the 
outer solid rocket boosters failed to ignite. The forces produced by the asymmetric thrust 
tore the vehicle apart 26 seconds into the flight. The second VLS-1 launch on 11 
December 1999 also failed. In this launch, the second stage motor exploded, losing the 
scientific payload.  
The third attempt to launch VLS-1 ended in tragedy on 22 August 2003. Figure 2 
shows VLS-1 V3 on the launch pad during the systems integration process. At the time, 
the mobile launch platform enclosed the rocket, allowing technicians to complete the 
systems integration with the rocket on the launch pad. 
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Figure 2.  The VLS-1 V3 vehicle on the launch pad.124 
As technicians prepared the vehicle for its 25 August 2003 launch date, one of the 
four outer solid rocket motors ignited spontaneously, killing 21 technicians and engineers 
and destroying the launch pad.125 Figure 3 shows the aftermath of the explosion. Popular 
media in Brazil forwarded the theory that the United States sabotaged the program in 
such a way as to cripple further development.126 An investigation conducted by 
COMAER, however, ruled out the possibility of sabotage, theorizing that a static 
electricity discharge from one of the technicians to the ignition circuitry may have been 
responsible for the accident.127 The COMAER report also criticized poor management 
and substandard equipment and parts.128 Further investigation by the Brazilian Congress 
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found that budget constraints contributed to the accident. With restricted and uncertain 
budgets, the program could not launch frequently, leading to an undertrained technical 
cadre.129 
 
Figure 3.  The ruins of the VLS launch tower.130 
Although Brazil would successfully launch the first VSB-30, a sub-orbital sounding 
rocket, from Alcântara on 23 October 2004, the VLS-1 V3 accident halted further launch 
activity. Brazil would not launch another rocket, another VSB-30, until 19 July 2007. 
c. Brazil and the ISS 
Brazil’s collaboration with China and progress toward satellite launch capability 
did not go unnoticed by the United States; however, the decision to collaborate on the ISS 
hinged on key interests on both sides. Brazil’s primary goal was to make CLA a 
commercially viable launch site for global partners. Since 80 percent of world market for 
satellites is comprised of U.S. firms, Brazil first had to satisfy the United States of the 
peaceful nature of its space program.131 The United States had already rebuffed Brazilian 
efforts to reach an agreement allowing U.S. firms to use CLA. Furthermore, the MTCR 
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effectively blocked the transfer of components Brazil required for the VLS program.132 
The United States, on the other hand, was anxious to secure Brazil’s support for the 
FTAA. In addition, the United States needed additional international partners to bolster 
domestic support for the ISS program, and likely saw an opportunity to check Chinese 
influence in Brazil’s space program.133 For the United States, the invitation to participate 
in the ISS represented a non-military avenue for cooperation in space. For Brazil, it 
represented an offer it could not refuse without jeopardizing other goals.134 
To overcome U.S. objections to its space program, Brazil passed legislation 
prohibiting the export of dual-use missile technology and created the AEB as a civilian 
space agency, both prerequisites to joining the MTCR. Brazil officially joined the MTCR 
on 27 October 1994. In addition to this, Brazil passed legislation enforcing international 
patent law, thereby committing to protect intellectual property rights.135 Brazil also 
signed the NPT in 1998 to allay fears of Brazil pursuing nuclear weapon technology 
along with ballistic missiles. Brazil and the United States finalized the ISS agreement in 
October of 1996 in which Brazil agreed to produce six pieces of flight hardware for the 
ISS, representing a total investment of US$120 million.136 In return, Brazil could send 
experiments to the ISS, as well as one Brazilian astronaut.137 
Brazil would fail to live up to its ISS commitments for many reasons. First, 
participating did not directly advance any of the goals set forth in the PNAE. The 
commitment of US$120 million, even over the course of three years, represented a large 
fraction of the budget for all Brazilian space activities, this expense coming during the 
culmination of CBERS-1 and 2.138 This, in turn, accounts for the lack of interest of 
Brazilian aerospace companies, namely Embraer, to participate. Second, the AEB, in its 
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infancy, did not have the political clout to lobby for an increase in the space budget to 
cover the costs of ISS participation. INPE and COMAER still largely ran the 
organizations that form SINDAE. AEB, located in Brasília, is 1,000 kilometers away 
from the center of space activities in São José dos Campos (DCTA and INPE) in the state 
of São Paulo.139 Third, even if the AEB had more clout, Brazil ran into difficult 
economic times in the later 1990s and early 2000s. The Mexican Peso crisis in 1994 and 
the Asian financial crisis in 1998 disrupted Brazilian markets. As a result, Brazil was 
forced to devalue its currency in 1999. This was followed by the collapse of the 
Argentine economy and a drought from June 2001 to May 2002 that reduced Brazil’s 
hydroelectric power generation. All of these events pushed Brazil into a recession.140 By 
2002, it was clear Brazil would not fulfill its agreement. Marco Cesar Pontes, the 
Brazilian astronaut (and Naval Postgraduate School alumni) trained by NASA under this 
agreement remembers, “INPE removed the project from its organizational diagram. The 
two-story building, intended to house the technical sector of Brazil’s participation in the 
ISS program, became Chinese ‘space.’”141 
To save some face and keep the program alive, Brazil negotiated with NASA to 
reduce its commitment to the ISS to US$10 million. As a consequence, NASA cancelled 
the flight of Marco Pontes to the ISS; however, his flight would occur a different way. In 
an effort to boost the visibility of Brazil’s space program among Brazilians, the AEB 
decided to plan the Missão Centenário (Centenary Mission) to commemorate the 100
th
 
year since Santos Dumont’s flight around the Eiffel Tower.142 Russia agreed to train and 
send Pontes as part of the ISS Expedition 13 crew. On 29 March 2006, he and two 
Russian crewmembers launched from Baikonur, Kazakhstan. Pontes spent a total of 10 
days in space, with eight days at the ISS conducting experiments in microgravity, and 
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returned with the Russian Expedition 12 crew.143 The flight, however, did not have the 
positive public relations effect that the AEB had hoped for. The AEB received a great 
deal of criticism for the relatively inexpensive cost of US$10 million, paid to the 
Russians, for the flight.144 
In the end, neither side achieved all that it hoped. The United States extended the 
worldwide non-proliferation regime and won concessions from Brazil on patent law but 
did not receive the promised ISS hardware. Brazil effectively ended further talks on the 
FTAA.145 Brazil succeeded in ending the embargo on launch vehicle components and 
reached an agreement allowing U.S. firms to use the CLA; however, the CLA remains 
unprofitable at present. Ultimately, the failed cooperation strained Brazil-U.S. 
cooperation in space.  
d. Russian and Ukrainian Cooperation 
As further evidence of these strained relations and the struggles the Brazilian 
launcher program faced after the VLS-1 V3 accident, Brazil reached out to Ukraine and 
Russia to form joint launch vehicle ventures. In 2003, Brazil and Ukraine signed a treaty 
creating the Alcântara Cyclone Space Company, paving the way to bring the Ukrainian 
Cyclone-4 booster to the CLA.146 The venture is projected to be profitable in roughly 10 
to 12 years with a minimum of six launches per year. This will require customers outside 
of Brazil and Ukraine to ensure profitability since the demand in each country is 
estimated to be four to five launches per year.147 If successful, this collaboration will 
allow Brazil and Ukraine to launch payloads as massive as 5600 kg into LEO and up to 
1600 kg into a geostationary transfer orbit (GTO).148 A GTO is the preliminary orbit 
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required to achieve GEO; hence, the maximum payload to GEO would be less than the 
figure quoted for GTO. While this would represent a significant capability for both 
programs, the limited GEO payload is unlikely to attract many customers.149  
Unfortunately, tensions between Russia and Ukraine have hampered the schedule. 
In 2004, the Orange Revolution created financial problems in Ukraine, delaying the 
fabrication of the first booster.150 In 2014, Russia invaded Ukraine taking Crimea. The 
unrest continues as of this writing. Originally scheduled for 2006 launch, the first 
Cyclone-4 vehicle is now scheduled to be delivered to Alcântara in the second half of 
2015. According to a project status update posted to the company’s website on 16 April 
2014, the recent unrest in Ukraine has not impacted the project.151 There are reasons, 
however, to doubt this claim. Chief among them is the reliance of Ukraine on Russian 
subcontractors for components of the Cyclone-4 booster.152  
Brazilian-Russian cooperation in space dates back to final moments of the Soviet 
Union. In 1988, Brazil signed an agreement with Russia to cooperate in space for 
peaceful purposes.153 Brazil renewed this agreement with Russia in 1997.154 Russia has 
focused on assisting Brazil with the development of liquid rocket motors for the VLS 
program. In 1996, the CTA contracted with the International Center for Advanced 
Studies of the Moscow Aviation Institute to provide graduate education for Brazilian 
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engineers on liquid rocket propulsion. In the aftermath of the VLS-1 V3 accident, Brazil 
reached out again to Russia for assistance in modifying the design of the VLS-1 rocket, 
including testing a new liquid rocket motor design.155  
Russian investors funded an initial collaboration between AEB and the Russian 
Federal Space Agency (RKA) called the Projeto de Sistemas de Lançamentos Espaciais 
Orion (Orion Space Launch Systems Project). This project called for a heavy booster 
capable of launching 14,000 kg into LEO and up to 6,000 kg into GTO.156 Although this 
initial program failed financially, a new collaboration began in 2004 called the Cruzeiro 
do Sul (Southern Cross) program, leveraging the Russian RD-191 rocket motor.157 This 
ambitious program called for the creation of a family of five launch vehicles, with 
capabilities ranging from small LEO payloads, to polar orbits, to heavy-lifting GTO 
boosters.158 Given the emphasis on launch capability, COMAER was the lead 
organization for the collaboration.  
The initial burst of activity for this project led Yury Zaitsev, an analyst at the 
Institute of Space Research at the Russian Academy of Sciences, to suggest that Russia 
was attempting (or perhaps should make the attempt) to muscle Ukraine out of a 
potentially lucrative market.159 However, like the many other Brazilian space projects 
that preceded it, the Cruzeiro do Sul has also been plagued by delays. The newest version 
of the PNAE, covering Brazil’s space plans for the period 2012 to 2021, eliminated the 
largest of the five Cruzeiro do Sul vehicles and added a small microsatellite launcher in 
partnership with Germany.160 There is no indication today that Brazil is favoring Russia 
over Ukraine in space cooperation.  
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C. BRAZIL AND THE SPACE TECHNOLOGY LADDER 
As José Raimundo Braga Coelho, president of the AEB writes in the forward of 
the 2012–2021 PNAE, “This fourth version of the PNAE is decidedly more realistic than 
previous plans, but it also has eyes fixed on a horizon of dreams.”161 The plan organizes 
Brazil’s space activities into two phases. The first phase completes several long-standing 
projects, like the VLS-1. The second phase builds off these successes to develop strategic 
capabilities, recognizing the need to boost industry support and to maintain a trained 
technical cadre.162  
The launch dates predicted in the plan have already slipped. The Amazônia-1 
satellite, the new name for SSR-1, is currently scheduled for a December 2016 launch.163 
The plan also predicted the launch of VLS-1 V4 in 2015, but the two planned test flights 
prior to this launch have not yet taken place, placing this date into question. Likewise, the 
Veículo Lançador de Microsatélites (Microsatellite Launch Vehicle [VLM]) 
collaboration with Germany, originally scheduled to launch in 2015, is now scheduled to 
launch in 2016. As mentioned earlier, the first launch of the Cyclone-4 rocket is now 
scheduled no sooner than the second half of 2015, when the launch vehicle is now 
scheduled to be delivered to Alcântara. Finally, the plan predicted the launch of the 
launch of the first Satélite Geoestacionário de Defesa e Comunicações Estratégicas 
(Geostationary Defense and Strategic Communications Satellite, SGDC) in 2014; 
however, the satellite will not be delivered until 2016.164For the purposes of assessing 
Brazil’s space program using the Space Technology Ladder, projects beyond the time 
horizon of 2020 are not considered, given the chronic delays experienced by the program. 
Table 2 matches milestones in the Brazilian space program with the milestones set forth 
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in the Space Technology ladder, including projected dates for nearer-term projects (see 
Table 1 for the explanation of the levels). 
Table 2.   Brazil and the Space Technology Ladder 
Category Level Milestones 
Development of Launch 
Capability 
13 Beyond 2016: Pending successful Cyclone-4 
GTO launch 
12 Projected 2016: Launch of VLM-1 





8 1985: Brasilsat A1 
Mastery of LEO 
Satellite Technology 
7 1993: SCD-1 
6 2013: CBERS-3 (50% Brazil/50% China) 
5  
4 1998: CBERS-1 (30% Brazil/70% China) 
3  
Formation of National 
Space Agency 
2 1971: Formation of COBAE (military) 
1994: Formation of AEB (civilian) 
1 1961: Formation of CNAE 
 
Starting at the base of the ladder, Brazil has long had organizations that served the 
function of national-level space committees and agencies; however, as Brazil’s case 
demonstrates, the existence of these institutions does not necessarily mean the program 
has a firm foundation. 
Brazil’s development of LEO satellite technology sheds further insights into the 
difficulties of developing these technologies. Brazil has long been reliant on satellite data 
for meteorology and environment monitoring (e.g., Landsat). Given this dependency, 
Brazil might have procured its own satellites for these purposes; however, as Brazil 
acknowledges in the 2005–2014 PNAE, countries must develop strategic technologies on 
their own—Brazil does not want to defer to third parties.165 Hence, Brazil has focused on 
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developing its own industry and infrastructure and used collaborations that transfer 
technology to further their goals in this arena. 
Collaboration with the United States has been limited by the strict export controls 
on munitions (which include some satellites and satellite components). Hence, Brazil has 
reached out to China, Russia, and Ukraine to collaborate. Recently, however, 
USSOUTHCOM has reached out to Brazil, Chile, and Peru to collaborate on testing the 
capabilities of a modified CubeSat (a class of small satellites, typically a 10-centimeter 
cube), Space and Missile Defense Command Nano-Satellite Program-3 (SNaP-3), 
launched on 5 December 2013.166 Recent revisions to U.S. export control may permit 
more extensive collaborations in the future. 
GEO satellite technology is different. Here Brazil has exclusively contracted out 
to international companies to develop and launch these satellites, while Brazilian 
companies operate them. Historically, Brazil has only purchased GEO satellites for 
civilian communication. The SGDC-1 satellite will branch out into specific military 
capabilities. Brazil is also planning a geosynchronous meteorological satellite, GEOMET-
1, for launch in 2018.167 This would eliminate Brazil’s reliance on U.S. meteorological 
assets, like the Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite (GOES). Brazil and the 
United States currently share GOES-12, which Brazil considers a strategic vulnerability. 
It is not known at this time how Brazil will construct this satellite, but AEB has 
announced intentions of using the Cyclone-4 booster for launch.168  
Finally, while Brazil has enjoyed a successful sounding rocket program, 
indigenous orbital launch capabilities remain elusive. Brazil’s efforts have been the target 
of U.S. non-proliferation efforts, prompting outreach to U.S. competitors, like Russia. 
Even with outside assistance, Brazil’s program has been hamstrung by faltering budgets, 
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turmoil between Russia and Ukraine, and tragedy. In 2011, the Rouseff administration 
announced intentions to spend R$2.1 billion over the period 2012 to 2015 in support of 
the newest PNAE.169 According the AEB, the program spent roughly R$450 million, 
giving some hope that Brazil will finally achieve its goals.  
D. THE DOMESTIC ORIENTATION OF BRAZIL’S SPACE PROGRAM 
The most current PNAE envisions Brazil’s space program as a way to stimulate 
the growth of industry, which in turn secures the strategic and geopolitical value of space 
to boost Brazil’s autonomy and sovereignty.170 This would indicate realist motivations 
for pursuing space technology, yet Brazil’s commitment to space has wavered from the 
technical nationalism that characterizes Asian space ambitions to neglect.171 According 
to GDP data released by the World Bank on 24 September 2014, Brazil has the seventh 
largest economy in the world, valued at US$2.2 trillion. China is the second largest, 
valued at US$9.2 trillion; Russia is just below Brazil as the eighth largest at US$2.1 
trillion; and, India is the tenth largest economy at US$1.9 trillion.172 According to 
estimates made by the OECD in 2010, China spent US$6.5 billion on space, with Russia 
spending US$2.7 billion, India US$1.2 billion, and Brazil US$176 million.173 The 
reasons why Brazil spends so little on the development of space capabilities demonstrate 
that domestic politics have the strongest influence on the orientation of the space 
program. 
Part of the difficultly of funding space comes from its connection to the military. 
Like the military, space simply does not compete well with other social spending 
priorities in Brazil. With rare notable exceptions, Latin America has transitioned from a 
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zone of negative peace (the absence of intrastate war) to a zone of stable peace (peace is 
accepted as a norm).174 The collapse of the Argentine military after the 
Falklands/Malvinas War coupled with the end of the Cold War made it difficult for the 
Brazilian military to justify increased spending. José Viegas Filho, a former Minister of 
Defense, summed it up succinctly: “Brazil has no enemies. There is not one country in 
the world that hates us or is prejudiced against us.”175  
This “crisis of identity” sent the military looking for internal missions versus 
trying to justify its existence against a non-existent external threat.176 The basis for this 
focus comes from Article 142 of Brazil’s constitution that directs the military to ensure 
law and order.177 The Brazilian War College defines internal security as “all the 
processes by which the state protects itself against antagonisms and pressures of any 
origin, form, or nature that occur within it.”178 As a result of this broad definition, the 
number of military officers, active and reserve, has grown across government public 
safety organizations.179 The military directs its inward focus to Brazil’s “‘Green’ 
Amazon (land and river areas within the Amazon Basin) and ‘Blue’ Amazon (coastal 
areas of Brazil where major hydro-carbon and other resources are located).”180 Without a 
specific threat to defend against, Brazil’s military structure must be capable of adapting 
and massing quickly to threats as they present themselves.181 
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This presents a puzzle. Providing security for Brazil’s vast territory strongly 
indicates the need for increased spending on space assets. Indeed, Brazil’s National 
Strategy of Defense published in 2008, identifies space along with nuclear and 
cyberspace technologies requiring further investments.182 Based on 2013 data, Brazil 
spends more on defense than all other Latin America countries combined (1.29 percent of 
GPD); however, 73 percent of defense spending funds “wages, salaries, pensions and 
social security payments,” leaving very little to invest in these strategic areas.183 The 
money not taken by personnel costs must be spread over many competing projects. 
Funding for launch vehicle development must compete for funding for SIVAM, for 
example. This trend of reduced military spending began soon after the transition to 
democracy. 
The reduction of military spending was not exclusively motived by a desire to 
punish the military for human rights abuses during military rule. After the transition to 
democracy in 1985, many observers questioned the ability of the new civilian 
government to reign in military influence in the government, especially in the budget 
process.184 These fears proved to be unfounded. In 1988, Brazil’s new constitution 
solidified congressional control over the budget process, creating democratic competition 
for resources. During military rule, the government concentrated the defense industry in 
the state of São Paulo.185 Brazil’s launch sites (operated by the military) are too remote 
and employ too few people to be politically useful. In fact, the CLA has been a political 
liability for local politicians since the land for the site was expropriated from the poor 
descendants of a former maroon colony for runaway slaves (quilombo).186 Thus, in 
contrast to the United States, where legislators fight to secure military spending in their 
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states and districts, only a few Brazilian politicians have an incentive to fund the military 
to secure votes. 
The lack of electoral incentives to fund the military lead to what David Pion-
Berlin and Harold Trinkunas describe as “attention deficits” with respect to defense 
policy—politicians choose not to invest the time necessary to understand the 
requirements of the armed forces.187 Thus, funding the military diverts funds from 
politically expedient social programs, weakening the military’s ability to persuade 
legislators for funds.188  
Not surprisingly then, the military side of space (launch vehicle development and 
launch site operations) has made much slower progress than the civilian side of space 
(satellite applications). Yet, as discussed previously, civilian cooperation with China and 
United States has also been underfunded. Due to the historically close ties with the 
military, satellite development is also tied to the defense industry in São Paulo. Thus, 
civilian space policy in Brazil suffers from the same lack of incentives as military space 
policy.  
Space investments, in general, have two further complications. First, the defense 
sector had a developed industrial base, but the transition to democracy shrunk its capacity 
substantially. Because of the erratic funding of the space program, few companies are 
willing to participate. Those that do participate are looking for ways to court foreign 
customers to bolster low domestic demand.189 Thus, the industrial support for the space 
industry continues to lag. Second, industry and government alike have a shortage of 
qualified personnel. Brazil is trying to boost the number of qualified professionals by 
reducing the amount of time required to graduate, increasing the number of graduate 
schools in space disciplines, and retaining graduates with competitive salaries.190  
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In 2011, Brazil launched Ciência sem Fronteiras (Science without Borders), an 
ambitious effort to boost the number of qualified personnel across a wide variety of 
technical disciplines. The program will fund up to 101,000 scholarships (75,000 federally 
funded, 26,000 privately funded) at the baccalaureate, master’s, and doctorate level over 
the course of four years.191 According to data released in September 2014, the program 
has awarded 71,478 federally-funded scholarships, on track to meet program goals.192 
AEB received a quota of 300 scholarships: 150 for Brazilians to study abroad and 150 for 
foreign students to study in Brazil.193  
Although Brazil is aggressively addressing the lack of technical expertise, recent 
public protests in Brazil further reinforce the politician’s incentives to continue 
neglecting space development. Triggered by an increase in the price of bus fares in São 
Paulo and overall discontent with the expenditures for the 2014 FIFA World Cup, the 
protests of 2013 quickly spread to encompass a wide range of grievances. Datafolha, a 
Brazilian polling institute, reported that the top eight grievances were health care, 
education, corruption, need for change, safety, politicians, quality transport, and transport 
cost.194 While bus fares may have sparked the protests, Brazilians are angrier about the 
quality of their democracy. A Pew research report confirms this widespread 
dissatisfaction.195 Given this discontent, funding for the military and space will continue 
to compete for funding with pressing social issues.  
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E. THE INTERNATIONAL ORIENTATION OF BRAZIL’S SPACE 
PROGRAM 
Large territory, rich natural resources, and a large economy motivate Brazilians to 
seek a more prominent role in global leadership.196 Brazil’s global aspirations include a 
permanent seat on the UN Security Council (UNSC) and to have a Brazilian as the 
Director General of the World Trade Organization and President of the International 
Development Bank.197 Brazil, however, still lacks the military and economic clout 
required to compete for influence among great powers. Even on a regional scale, Sean 
Burges describes Brazil as leading “without sticks or carrots.”198 Consequently, Brazil 
attempts to project its influence into the world via “soft power.”199  
Economic development is a key stumbling block to Brazil’s global and regional 
ambitions. Understandably then, economic development motivates Brazil’s foreign 
policy.200 Economic policy, however, is also rooted in domestic political ideology. Thus, 
the waxing and waning of Brazil’s economic fortunes has resulted in a fluid foreign 
policy. This is evident in the regional and international orientation of Brazil’s space 
program, which has spanned non-democratic regimes and democratic, as well as center-
right and far-left presidencies. 
                                                 
196 Peter Hakim, “Two Ways to Go Global,” Foreign Affairs 81, no. 1 (2002): 157, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/20033009. 
197 Andrés Malamud, “A Leader without Followers? The Growing Divergence between the Regional 
and Global Performance of Brazilian Foreign Policy,” Latin American Politics and Society 53, no. 3 
(2011): 19, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1548-2456.2011.00123.x/abstract. 
198 Sean W. Burges, “Without Sticks or Carrots: Brazilian Leadership in South America During the 
Cardoso Era, 1992–2003*,” Bulletin of Latin American Research 25, no. 1 (January 2006): 23, 
doi:10.1111/j.0261-3050.2006.00151.x. 
199 Susanne Gratius and Miriam Gomes Saraiva, “Continental Regionalism: Brazil’s Prominent Role 
in the Americas,” in Enhancing the Brazil-EU Strategic Partnership: From the Bilateral and Regional to 
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During the military regime, the military regime isolated itself internationally to 
insulate itself from criticisms about human rights violations.201 The regime also isolated 
itself economically by implementing Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) policy, 
sheltering domestic industry from foreign competition. The policy was successful in 
boosting Brazilian exports from five percent of GDP in the 1950s to 12 percent by the 
end of the military regime in the 1980s.202 Economic success fueled Brazil’s competition 
with Argentina in nuclear and space development; however, although Brazil enjoyed 
success in selling military arms, Russell and Britta Campbell note that Brazil “spent 
relatively little on its own military.”203 
In the wake of the oil crisis of 1973 and the ensuing debt crisis in 1979, the 
military government saw its ISI policy failing and began forging new economic ties.204 
Brazil used technical cooperation in space as an avenue to open better relations with 
China, leading to the CBERS program after the transition to military rule. As mentioned 
earlier, the idea for this outreach came from Itamaraty, not the military. Nor was the 
move motivated by ideological affinities to Chinese socialism.205 More attractive was the 
Chinese “no strings attached” policy to lending that did not stipulate conditions on 
democracy and humans rights. Chinese policy meshes well with the Latin American 
norms of non-intervention and sovereignty.  
After the transition to democracy and as the military was forced to compete for 
resources, the geopolitical orientation of space activities in Brazil faded, leaving only the 
developmental objectives that had always been present. Unfortunately, the same attention 
deficits that hounded defense policy in the new civilian government limited the funding 
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provided to the CBERS program, preventing Brazil from gaining all it could from the 
collaboration. 
Brazil’s relationship with the United States is more complicated. Overall, Brazil 
and the United States enjoy good relations (the revelations of Edward Snowden 
notwithstanding); however, Brazil’s emphasis on regional multilateralism and 
nonintervention and the U.S. emphasis on free markets restrict the potential areas for 
cooperation. This is evident in the failure of the Brazil-U.S. ISS collaboration. The 
United States clearly miscalculated Brazil’s support for the FTAA and the ability of 
Brazilian industry to support the program. Brazil overestimated the U.S. demand for its 
CLA facilities and underestimated the ill will it would generate with NASA by backing 
out of its commitments. 
The economic downturn of 1998, coupled with the persistent inequality and 
government corruption of Latin America, created an opening for left-wing political 
parties to come to power—the so-called “Pink Tide” or New Left.206 Although the 
United States was quick to support an IMF rescue package for Brazil, the effort failed to 
stabilize Brazil’s currency.207 Although President Cardoso was credited with halting 
Brazil’s hyperinflation woes, the crisis damaged the public confidence in his neoliberal 
reforms, albeit limited, and led to the election of President Luis Inácio Lula da Silva 
(affectionately known as Lula in Brazil), leader of the Marxist Partido dos 
Trabalhadores (Worker’s Party). With Lula’s election, the opportunity to improve Brazil-
U.S. cooperation in space shrank even further. With Lula’s election, outreach to China 
and Russia at the expense of U.S. relations could be justified at an ideological level. Any 
hope of further ISS cooperation after Marco Pontes’s flight became more distant. 
The Lula administration also intensified efforts to increase regional integration. 
As Susan Gratius and Miriam Saraiva describe, what began with the thawing of relations 
between Argentina and Brazil in 1985 and the formation of MERCOSUR in 1991 led to 
the formation of the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) in 2008 and the 
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Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (Celac) in 2011.208 MERCOSUR, 
UNASUR, and Celac provide alternative forums to the OAS, which is the forum the 
United States participates in. “Soft-balancing” U.S. influence in Latin America became 
an explicit goal of Brazilian foreign policy during the administration of Lula and his 
successor President Dilma Rouseff.209 President Rouseff, however, distanced herself 
from Lula’s outreach to Iran and Venezuela.210 
While the political maneuverings of these alliances resemble great power politics, 
two points should be kept in mind. First, the greatest threat to each of these regimes is 
another economic crisis, not an external military power. Each economic downturn tends 
to create a crisis of confidence in the electorate for the current policies, increasing the 
chances of regime change. Second, these organizations are born out the Pink Tide and 
represent an attempt to minimize the influence of policies thought to have caused the 
previous economic crisis.211 Consequently, these organizations often espouse anti-
American sentiments, but this is a byproduct of balancing against a domestic threat.212 
Although Steven David uses the framework of realism to describe the alignment of 
developing nations, Stephanie Neuman is correct to point out that many of the underlying 
assumptions of realism do not apply to these nations.213 
Brazil is also active in discussions on international space policy in the UN. Brazil 
participates in the Conference on Disarmament (CD), the multinational forum established 
by the UN to discuss issues of nuclear disarmament. The agenda of the CD also includes 
discussion on the proposed Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) 
treaty.214 Over the past decade, the CD has debated two main proposals seeking pave the 
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way to a more comprehensive PAROS treaty. In 2008, China and Russia released a draft 
of the “Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space” (PPWT). 
This treaty sought to ban from space “any device placed in outer space, based on any 
physical principle, specially produced or converted to eliminate, damage or disrupt 
normal functions of objects in outer space.”215 The European Union proposed a non-
binding Code of Conduct (CoC) for Outer Space Activities that seeks to establish 
international norms for the peaceful and sustainable use of outer space.216 Brazil favors 
the PPWT over the CoC. According to Brazil, “Transparency and confidence-building 
measures [separate from CoC]…can foster mutual understanding, political dialogue and 
cooperation among States. Yet we also note that they cannot be a substitute for legally 
binding norms.”217 The United States opposes the PAROS  
With Brazil’s emphasis on improving regional relationships, it comes as no 
surprise that Brazil has revived the idea (one that it once opposed) of a joint Latin 
American space agency. In October of 2013, Brazil proposed the formation of Aliança 
Latino-Americana de Agências Espacias (Alliance of Latin-American Space Agencies 
[ALAS]) at a conference attended by representatives from Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, 
Costa Rica, Ecuador, México, Paraguay, and Peru participated in the conference.218 The 
initial activities of this proposed alliance would focus on two areas: creating collaboration 
among Latin American universities on small satellite programs and establishing a central 
digital distribution hub for satellite data. The modest goals of this alliance focus on key 
developmental needs for fledgling space programs. The timing of this effort, however, 
comes as unrest and disinterest, respectively, threaten its collaborations with Ukraine and 
China. 
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The Brazilian space program introduces many themes that help understand Latin 
America as a region. First, the desire to develop economically is the fundamental driver 
of Brazil’s space program. The era of military rule added a geopolitical element to the 
program, but this faded after the return to democracy. Since the return to democracy, 
space now competes poorly with other social and developmental priorities due to a lack 
of electoral incentives for Brazilian politicians.  
Second, domestic politics matter most when determining the regional and 
international orientation of these space programs. Economic development drives foreign 
policy in Latin America. Economic failure discredits the development strategies 
employed by the leaders in power, often ushering in regime change. Economic crises 
sped the end of military rule in Latin America and assisted the rise of the New Left. Thus, 
foreign policy remains fluid as the ideology of the government shifts. The emphasis on 
regional and international cooperation in space is influenced by the development strategy 
chosen, which is heavily influenced by ideology, and partners are often selected to meet 
further specific domestic goals, which may be unrelated to space development. Shifting 
economic fortunes and political stability can also strain and break international 
collaborations. 
Third, international forces also influence these programs. International 
collaboration is restricted by nuclear and missile nonproliferation regimes, which rankle 
Latin American sensitivities to the norm of sovereignty.219 U.S. export control 
regulations limit the scope of potential projects that might have otherwise been 
accommodated by domestic politics, driving Latin American space programs to seek 
other partners, including nations hostile to U.S. interests. Furthermore, the U.S. played a 
prominent role in establishing the NPT and the MTCR. Consequently, when they are 
invoked the United States is blamed for intervention. Nevertheless, these fledgling space 
programs greatly benefit from collaborations with more advanced nations. 
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III. OTHER LATIN AMERICAN SPACE PROGRAMS 
The experience of the Brazilian space program introduces themes relevant to the 
other programs in Latin America. First, economic development has always formed the 
foundation of each program, and democracy reinforces this focus, erasing any 
geopolitical imprint a military regime may have imparted. Second, domestic politics are 
key to understanding the regional and international orientation of each program. The 
prevalence of military rule in the region highlights the importance of considering the 
influence of civil-military relationships as part of domestic politics. Like in Brazil, the 
transition to democracy sent many Latin American militaries scrambling to find new 
missions and forced them to compete against pressing social issues for funding, directly 
impacting military budgets for space. Even civilian efforts in space are impeded by a lack 
of political incentives. Economic boom and bust can also alter domestic politics, which, 
in turn, can change the orientation of the space program. Finally, international influences 
can both help and hinder progress in space development. Latin American space programs 
prefer international collaborations that result in the transfer of technology and the training 
of human resources. Domestic political ideology can also favor collaboration with some 
nations and strain relationships with others. 
This chapter begins by presenting brief descriptive histories of the space programs 
of Argentina, Venezuela, Mexico, Peru, and Chile. The chapter then discusses the 
recurring themes that emerge from these programs in the context of the broader themes 
introduced in chapter two. The chapter concludes by summarizing the progress of each 
program on the Space Technology Ladder. The space programs of Bolivia, Colombia, 
Ecuador, and Uruguay are classified as minor space programs due to the limited scope of 
the activities of their space agencies. The descriptive histories of these programs are 
given in the appendix; however, they are discussed as appropriate. 
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A. ARGENTINA 
Argentina’s strategic vision, similar to Brazil’s concept of grandeza, coupled with 
military rule gave rise to geopolitical competition in space in the 1960s and 1970s.220 The 
rivalry with Brazil placed Argentina’s technological development in space on a similar 
trajectory. Like Brazil, Argentina also participated in grass-roots space societies after the 
end of World War II. Teofilo Tabanera, the founder of the Sociedad Argentina 
Interplanetaria (Argentine Interplanetary Society), led the effort to lobby for the creation 
of a civilian space agency in Argentina. On 28 January 1960, Argentina founded the 
Comisión Nacional de Investigaciones Espaciales (National Commission of Space 
Research [CNIE]); however, the decree placed the CNIE under the Fuerza Aérea 
Argentina (Argentine Air Force [FAA]).221 Like the Brazilian Air Force, the FAA also 
had a technical institute that conducted space research: the Instituto de Investigaciones 
Aeronáuticas y Espaciales (Institute of Aeronautics and Space Research [IIAE]).  
Also like Brazil, much of Argentina’s early work in space dealt with sounding 
rockets. Argentina holds the distinction of launching the first sounding rocket designed 
and built entirely in Latin America.222 On 23 December 1969, Argentina became the 
fourth country in the world to launch a monkey into space. Juan, a capuchin monkey 
native to Argentina’s Misiones province, rode to an altitude of 82 kilometers (there is 
some uncertainty in sources about the exact altitude) and was safely recovered.223 In 
1970, Argentina succeeded in launching a sounding rocket to an altitude of 500 
kilometers.224  
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The growing influence of the military in government helped shield CNIE from the 
tumultuous political landscape during the first two decades of CNIE’s existence, allowing 
it to be successful. Coup d’états occurred frequently as power changed hands between 
right- and left-wing political parties. The coup of 1976 ushered in the most repressive and 
violent era in Argentine politics. Between 1976 and 1983, a period known as the National 
Reorganization Process, the military also took over the strategic direction of CNIE and 
started the Cóndor ballistic missile project.225  
The Argentine defeat in the Falklands/Malvinas War of 1982 discredited the 
military, ushering in an era of democracy. This also embittered Argentina against the 
United States. The Argentine military miscalculated that the United States would support 
them. With the Beagle Islands border dispute between Chile and Argentine resolved in 
1984 and no other real regional threats, the Argentine military struggled to redefine itself. 
Argentina continued the development of the Cóndor II ballistic missile project to 
maintain relevance. To accomplish this, President Raúl Alfonsín struck a secret deal with 
Iraq and Egypt to help fund the project in exchange for the technology.226 U.S. 
intelligence leaked information about the project to apply pressure through the MCTR 
(which Argentina would join in 1993).227 Ultimately, faced with the economic downturn 
of the 1980s, Argentina decided to discontinue the program rather than risk losing U.S. 
support to restructure its foreign debt.228 
On 28 May 1991, President Carlos Menem issued a decree dissolving CNIE, 
creating the Comisión Nacional de Actividades Espaciales (National Commission of 
Space Activities [CONAE]), and terminating the Cóndor II project all in one law.229 The 
law placed CONAE directly under the Office of the President, officially divesting the 
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military of control over the space program. This action was mild in comparison to other 
actions taken to subject Argentina’s military to civilian rule. Zoltan Barany argues that no 
other Latin American country punished its military to the extent Argentina did.230 
Granted, the human rights abuses seen in Argentina surpassed those of other countries. In 
1996, CONAE shifted to the Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Comercio 
Internacional y Culto (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, International Trade and Worship). As 
of 14 November 2012, CONAE now resides in the Ministerio de Planificación Federal, 
Inversión Pública y Servicios (Ministry of Federal Planning, Public Investment and 
Services).231  
 Although the new Argentine democracy stripped control of the space program 
from the military, it did not entirely eliminate its participation. In 1991, the Escuela de 
Ingeniería Aeronáutica (School of Aeronautical Engineering), run by the FAA, merged 
with the IIAE to form a new institution: the Instituto Univerisitario Aeronáutico 
(Aeronautical Graduate Institute).232 Here many of the engineers that previously worked 
on the Cóndor project began work on a small satellite, μSAT-1 (Víctor). Víctor launched 
successfully from Russia’s Plesetsk Cosmodrome on 29 August 1996, becoming the first 
satellite completely designed, built, and flight qualified by Argentine professionals.233  
Víctor, however, was not Argetina’s first satellite. This honor belongs to LUSAT-
1, an amateur radio satellite launched aboard an Arianne booster from French Guyana on 
21 January 1990. LUSAT-1 used the Radio Amateur Satellite Corporation (AMSAT) 
OSCAR (short for “Orbiting Satellite Carrying Amateur Radio”) design and was 
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constructed in the United States on behalf of the Argentine chapter of AMSAT.234 Even 
25 years later amateur radio enthusiasts have been able to receive faint signals from 
LUSAT-1.235 The 1990s also saw a thawing of relations between the United States and 
Argentina. Guido Di Tella, Argentina’s foreign minister at the time, famously described 
Argentina’s policy of engagement with the United States as “relaciones carnales” (carnal 
relations).236 Argentina ratified the Treaty of Tlateloclo (1995) and signed the NPT 
(1995). President Menem also infused the space program with US$700 million in 
1994.237 Collaboration between CONAE, NASA, and other international partners gave 
rise to the Satélites de Aplicación Científica (Scientific Applications Satellite [SAC]) 
Program. Argentina, Brazil, Italy, and the United States collaborated on the first of these 
satellites, SAC-B (launched ahead of SAC-A), to measure gamma rays. Argentina led the 
design, construction, and systems integration of the satellite, with Italy providing solar 
panels, the Unites States developing two scientific instruments, and Brazil performing the 
qualification testing at INPE.238 Unfortunately, in 1996, the U.S. Pegasus launch vehicle 
carrying SAC-B failed and the satellite was lost. 
The success of SAC-A quickly followed the failure of SAC-B. Argentina designed 
and built SAC-A as a technology test-bed for the more complex Earth-observing satellite, 
SAC-C. Space Shuttle Endeavour (STS-88) successfully inserted SAC-A into orbit in 
December of 1998.239 For the SAC-C mission, Argentina once again participated in an 
international team, comprised of Brazil, Denmark, France, Italy, and the United States. 
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The satellite worked in concert with Landsat 7, EO-1, and TERRA imaging the Earth with 
different resolutions and spectral bands. SAC-C launched successfully from Vandenberg 
Air Force Base aboard a Delta II rocket on 21 November 2000, and ended its mission on 
15 August 2013—over 4 years beyond its expected lifetime.240 Finally, CONAE played a 
contributing role in SAC-D/Aquarius (launched 10 June 2011), providing several 
scientific instruments. In all of these projects, CONAE relied heavily on INVAP S.E., a 
state-run technology corporation.241 All of these projects support CONAE’s strategic 
vision as expressed in the most recent revision of the Plan Espacial Nacional (National 
Space Plan).242 
Progress toward GEO satellites has been slower, but no less successful. A 
multination consortium composed of European Aeronautic Defense and Space Company 
(EADS, aka Airbus Group) and the Italian company Finmeccanica constructed 
Argentina’s first GEO communications satellite, NAHUEL-1A, which launched on 30 
January 1997.243 In 2006, Argentina created a state-owned company, Empresa Argentina 
de Soluciones Satelitales (Argentine Satellite Solutions Company [AR-SAT]) that took 
over the operation of the former Nahuelsat consortium.244 Like CONAE, AR-SAT turned 
to INVAP to design and fabricate the satellite. On 16 October 2014, an Ariane 5 launch 
vehicle successfully inserted ARSAT-1 into GEO, representing the first GEO satellite 
designed and built entirely in Latin America.245 
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Argentina has also been able to make progress toward a small-payload LEO 
launch vehicle. Building on the expertise developed during the Cóndor II project, as well 
as the successful collaboration with Brazil on the VS-30 sounding rocket in 2007, 
CONAE embarked on the Tronador project.246 In 2011, a design failure of the first 
prototype led to the current project, Tronador II. In August of 2014, the program 
successfully tested subsystems of the Tronador II in a short 27-second flight reaching an 
altitude of 2,200 meters.247 In 2013, the press reported that the first orbital test of the 
Tronador II might occur in September of 2015; however, CONAE has not announced an 
official date, pending more testing.248 
Since the Kirtchners came to power after Argentina’s financial crisis in the late 
1990s and early 2000s, the U.S.-Argentine relationship has cooled. The relationship 
soured further when two U.S. firms refused to restructure US$1.3 billion in debt.249 In 
2005, Latinobarómetro reported that only 32 percent of Argentines had a good opinion of 
the United States, the lowest in Latin America.250 Many in Argentina viewed the 
financial meltdown as a direct result of the neoliberal economic reforms required by the 
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Since this downturn of opinion, no 
additional NASA collaboration has been announced beyond the SAC-D/Aquarius 
mission.  
Instead, CONAE has been reaching out to other partners. CONAE announced a 
joint mission with Brazil (AEB and INPE) on an ocean-observation mission named 
Satélite Argentino Brasileño para Información del Mar (Argentine Brazilian Satellite for 
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Sea Information, or SABIA-Mar). COBAE has also announced a joint project with Italy 
on the Satélite Argentino de Observación Con Microondas (Argentine Microware 
Sounding Satellite, or SAOCOM). The primary mission is to measure soil moisture using 
microwave synthetic aperture radar. The first of the series is scheduled for a 2015 
launch.251  
Finally, in 2004, Argentina signed an agreement with China to cooperate in space 
on peaceful projects; however, little came of this until recently. In September of 2014, 
China and Argentina reached an agreement to allow China to install a deep-space antenna 
in Argentina’s Patagonia region. The deal is shrouded in secrecy, raising suspicions about 
the intended use of the facility, given the dual military/civilian use of the antenna.252 
Furthermore, Argentina is deeply indebted to China. Argentina has been unable to raise 
money through bonds after it defaulted on domestic bonds in 2002 in the wake of its 
financial crisis. Argentina has reached out to China and Russia to help ease its crisis.253 
Argentina’s continuing financial problems may dampen further space efforts as the 
political opposition to the Kirchner administration points out the high cost of ARSAT-1 
(US$270 million).254 
As expected given the similarity between the two programs, Argentina’s space 
program shares many of the themes of Brazil’s space program. Argentina’s transition to 
democracy effectively ended geopolitical competition with Brazil. The effort to bring the 
military under civilian control reduced military involvement in the program, but did not 
eliminate it. The Kirchner regime (both Néstor and Christina), however, have continued 
the humiliation of the military in a way that goes beyond holding individuals responsible 
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for human rights violations.255 In Latin America, Argentina currently collaborates with 
Brazil and is looking to work with Bolivia in the future.256 The MTCR also impeded 
early launcher development in Argentina. CONAE currently resides in the Ministry of 
Federal Planning, Public Investment and Services, which emphasizes its focus on 
economic development. Argentina’s current National Space Plan is due for an update in 
2015. For now, Argentina’s tenuous economic situation may limit the pace of progress in 
the future. 
B. VENEZUELA 
Venezuela shares the same challenges with geography as its other Andean Pact 
nations—Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru. The mountainous terrain of the Andes 
drives up the cost of building telecommunications infrastructure, making space-based 
communications an attractive option. In the 1980s, the Andean Pact nations studied the 
possibility of acquiring a GEO satellite to meet their telecommunications needs; however, 
the effort failed due to the financial difficulties experienced by most South American 
countries during the debt crisis of the 1980s.257 The project resumed in the late 1990s 
under the name Simón Bolívar Satellite System. When the company ANDESAT S.A., 
representing the consortium of Andean nations and its investors, failed to meet its 
deadlines, the agreement was cancelled, leaving the GEO orbital slot designated for it 
entangled in legal issues.258 
The Venezuelan constitution, drafted shortly after Hugo Chávez’s rise to power in 
1999, asserted Venezuela’s right to use space for peaceful purposes in accordance with 
international agreements. The constitution also paved the way for new institutions, 
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including the new Ministerio del Poder Popular para Ciencia, Tecnología e Industrias 
Intermedias (Ministry of Popular Power for Science, Technology, and Intermediate 
Industries) that oversaw space activities. Among its other activities, the ministry served 
as Venezuela’s first national-level space commission. In 2005, acting on the 
recommendations of a presidential committee headed by the ministry, President Chávez 
formed the Centro Espacial Venezolano (Venezuelan Space Center [CEV]), which 
became the Agencia Bolivariana para Actividades Espaciales (Bolivarian Agency for 
Space Activities, ABAE) in 2007.259 The name of Venezuela’s space agency gives a 
strong sense of the character of Chávez’s nationalism. The activities of ABAE are 
organized along four, by now familiar, themes: 
Promote the peaceful uses of outer space and technological development 
for life and peace; promote the development and growth of space 
capabilities in Venezuela through technology transfer and human training 
in order to achieve technological independence; coordinate and use space 
science and technology to satisfy social needs and support national 
programs; [and] promote regional integration and cooperation.260 
The emphasis on technology transfer and development of human capital is evident in 
ABAE’s effort to acquire satellite technology. 
In 2005, the CEV signed an agreement with the China’s CGWIC to design, 
fabricate, and launch a GEO communications satellite, build two ground stations, and 
train Venezuelan technicians to operate the stations. On 29 October 2008, China 
successfully launched the Simón Bolivar Satellite (designated VENESAT-1). As a result 
of the deal, 30 Venezuelan scientists and engineers received doctorates and 60 satellite 
technicians were trained at China’s Beihang University and the Chinese Academy of 
Space Technology (CAST).261 Aside from the telecommunications mission of the 
satellite, Venezuela also uses VENESAT-1 for several state social programs to include 
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telemedicine for citizens in remote areas, and disaster management.262 The total project 
cost US$406 million, of which the satellite itself cost US$241 million.263  
Venezuela signed a second agreement with the CGWIC in May 2011 to produce 
an Earth-observing satellite similar to Brazil’s CBERS satellites. Venezuela named its 
second satellite after Francisco de Miranda, an early advocate of independence from 
Spain.264 As part of the deal, CAST trained 52 Venezuelans in remote sensing.265 China 
successfully launched the satellite, officially designated the Venezuelan Remote Sensing 
Satellite-1 (VRSS-1), on 29 September 2012. VRSS-1 cost approximately US$140 million. 
The death of Chávez has not slowed Venezuela’s space activities. On 5 October 
2014, President Maduro signed a third agreement with CGWIC to build VRSS-2. Keeping 
with Venezuela’s tradition, this satellite will be named after Antonio José de Sucre, the 
leader of the Venezuelan independence movement.266 Venezuela plans to invest US$170 
million into this project, which is expected to take three years to complete. As part of the 
deal, CGWIC will collaborate with Venezuela in assembling the satellite in Venezuela. In 
preparation for this, Venezuela plans to inaugurate the Centro de Investigación y 
Desarrollo Espacial (Center for Space Research and Development) in the latter half of 
2015.267 The center will focus on small satellite technology.268 Venezuela has also 
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reached out to France, India, and the United Kingdom to train Venezuelan space 
professionals. In all, about 200 Venezuelans have been trained in remote sensing, project 
management, satellite design, and space insurance.269 
Venezuela is methodically moving up the Space Technology Ladder. ABAE 
reinforces these gains by emphasizing technology transfer and the creation of human 
capital to support its activities. The early acquisition of a GEO communications satellite 
by Venezuela is as much driven by the complicated geography of the Andes as the need 
to expand the audience of the strategic communication of the Bolivarian revolution. As 
an example, VENESAT-1 carried President Chávez’s Sunday talk show, Aló President, to 
much of the Caribbean and Central and South America.270 President Correa of Ecuador 
and President Morales of Bolivia have copied Chávez with programs of their own as 
well.271 Victor Cano, president of ABAE, stated the following: 
Our idea is to strengthen ourselves as a nation in the space industry but 
also rely on other countries within the region, such as Argentina and 
Brazil, which have already built several satellites and have more years of 
experience than us. In addition, we also support other countries, such as 
Bolivia, that are starting to delve in the space industry.272  
The acquisition of VRSS-1 and Venzuela’s focus on remote sensing reflects Venzuela’s 
desire to minimize U.S. influence, and at the same time strengthens ties with China, 
Europe, and India, all of whom are educating Venezuelan personnel. Thus, ABAE serves 
a clear domestic, regional, and international purpose. 
 Domestic economic problems may threaten the Venezuelan space program. The 
sharp drop in oil prices beginning in October 2014 threatens the solvency of the 
Venezuelan government. As of December 2014 the price of oil dropped to roughly 
US$60 per barrel. Venezuela requires a price of at least US$117 per barrel to import 
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needed goods and services and to stave off default on its debt.273 Roughly 96 percent of 
Venezuela’s export revenue comes from oil and Venezuela uses oil to pay off its debts to 
China, which now total more than US$10 billion.274 With annual inflation above 60 
percent and popular support for President Maduro eroding, an extended period of low oil 
prices will threaten the stability of regime.275 
C. MEXICO 
Like Brazil, Mexico also enjoyed an earlier collaboration with NASA in the space 
age, including tracking Project Mercury flights.276 Mexico already had an active civilian 
rocketry program. A group of students from the Universidad Autónoma de San Luis 
Potosí (Autonomous University of San Luis Potosí) led by Dr. Gustavo del Castillo y 
Gama launched Física-1 (Physics-1), Mexico’s first sounding rocket launch on 28 
December 1957. The rocket reached an altitude of 4 kilometers.277  
 Walter C. Buchanan, an American-trained engineer and head of the Secretaría de 
Comunicaciones y Transportes (Communications and Transportation Secretariat, SCT), 
commissioned two sounding rockets, SCT-1 and SCT-2, based on the German V-2 
design. On 24 October 1959, SCT-1 launched and reached an altitude of 4,000 meters 
before strong winds forced it into a horizontal trajectory. SCT-2 launched on 1 October 
1960, reaching an altitude of 25 kilometers.278 Buoyed by this success, Buchanan was 
instrumental in the creation of Mexico’s national space committee: the Comisión 
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Nacional del Espacio Exterior (National Commission on Outer Space [CONEE]) formed 
on 31 August 1962.279Between 1962 and 1977, CONEE capitalized on the success of the 
SCT launches to develop two series of sounding rockets (with Nahuatl translations): 
Tototl (bird) and, Mitl (arrow).280 In 1962, TOTOTL reached an altitude of 22 
kilometers. MITL 1 and MITL 2 achieved altitudes of 50 and 120 kilometers in 1976 and 
1975, respectively.281 
In 1968, Mexico founded the Satélites Mexicanos (Satmex) company to operate 
and manage its GEO satellites. Satmex was among the original companies forming the 
INTELSAT consortium.282 In 1977, Mexican President José López Portillo dissolved 
CONEE and Mexico would remain without a dedicated space policy body until 2010. 
Although Mexico would continue to collaborate with NASA on satellite tracking, 
Mexico’s progress in rocketry halted. In the interim years, Mexico pursued satellite 
technology. Mexico contracted with the Hughes Corporation to acquire its first 
telecommunications satellites. Space Shuttles Discovery and Atlantis carried Morelos 1 
(17 June 1985) and Morelos 2 (27 November 1988), respectively, into orbit. Once 
released, a secondary booster placed each in GEO orbit. The Atlantis mission also holds 
the distinction of carrying Mexico’s first astronaut, Rodolfo Neri Vela, into space.283  
During the 1990s, students and researchers at the Universidad Autónoma de 
México (National Autonomous University of Mexico, UNAM) built an amateur radio 
satellite, UNAMSAT-1, using the AMSAT OSCAR design.284 Unfortunately, on 28 
March 1995, the Russian Start-1 rocket failed, destroying the satellite. Undaunted, 
UNAM refurbished an engineering model to create UNAMSAT-B, which successfully 
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launched on 5 September 1996 from Russia’s Plesetsk Cosmodrome becoming Mexico’s 
first and only LEO satellite. UNAM announced a plan to place another microsatellite in 
orbit; however, no additional information has been made public since.285 
On 2 January 2014, the French company Eutelsat purchased Satmex and will take 
over the operation of Satmex’s three GEO satellite currently in operation (Satmex 5, 6, 
and 8).286 The SCT has also contracted with Boeing to construct two new GEO satellites, 
Mexsat-1 and 2. These satellites will modernize communications across the government, 
supporting the military, police, public health, and disaster relief. Mexico constructed two 
new satellite ground stations in Iztapalapa and Hermosillo to support these new assets.287 
Most recently, a private group called the Colectivo Espacial Mexicano (Mexican 
Space Collective) developed Ulises-1, a nanosatellite with a radio beacon for amateur 
radio enthusiast to track. The project is described as a work of art with the goal of 
showing that if a small group of committed citizens can design and launch a satellite, then 
anything is possible. The Japanese Space Agency will carry the satellite into orbit aboard 
an ISS service module early in 2015.288  
On 30 July 2010, Mexico established the Agencia Espacial Mexicana (Mexican 
Space Agency, AEM) to formulate Mexican space policy. The AEM is the result of 
nearly 20 years of lobbying by the Mexican space community represented by the 
Sociedad Espacial Mexicana (Mexican Space Society), a non-profit organization, as well 
as universities like UNAM and the Universidad del Ejército y Fuerza Aérea Mexicana 
(University of the Mexican Army and Air Force).289 
                                                 
285 Gabriela Alvarez, “Los Satélites Mexicanos: Presente Y Futuro [Mexican Satellites: Present and 
Future],” FuturoMx, December 31, 2013, http://www.futuromx.com/home/secciones/innovacion/item/132-
los-satelites-mexicanos-presente-y-futuro.html. 
286 Eutelsat, “Eutelsat Communications Concludes Acquisition of SATMEX,” January 2, 2014, 
http://www.eutelsat.com/en/news/2014/Eutelsat-Satmex.html. 
287 Boeing, “Boeing: Mexsat,” accessed November 6, 2014, http://www.boeing.com/boeing/defense-
space/space/bss/factsheets/702/mexsat/mexsat.page. 
288 Coletivo Espacial Mexicana, “Ulises Is Going to Space!,” accessed November 6, 2014, 
http://www.ulises1.mx/Ulises_1/Ulises_I.html; Coletivo Espacial Mexicana, “Lanzamiento 2014 [2014 
Launch],” accessed November 6, 2014, http://www.ulises1.mx/Ulises_1/Lanzamiento.html. 
289 Agencia Espacial Mexicana, “Antecedentes de La Agencia Espacial Mexicana [History of the 
Mexican Space Agency],” accessed November 6, 2014, http://www.aem.gob.mx/index01-4.html. 
 70 
The AEM published its vision for space over in Programa Nacional de 
Actividades Espacial 2011–2015. This document outlines five strategic areas of 
development that are aligned with Mexico’s National Development Plan: development of 
human capital, scientific research and technology development, development of the 
industrial sector, international outreach, financing and management.290 As the AEM 
presses forward with this initial vision, it is assessing the demand for space services 
across the government, academia, and industry. The AEM has also been active in 
reaching out to the United States, Canada, France, and others, opening doors to a variety 
of scientific exchanges. On 8 December 2014, the AEM announced an agreement with 
NASA to collaborate on advanced space communications systems for future Lunar and 
Mars missions.291 
 Early reports indicated that Mexico planned an US$80 million launch facility near 
the city of Chetumel on the Yucatan peninsula; however, there hasn’t been any recent 
reporting on progress.292 More recently, the AEM entered into an agreement with the 
German Space Agency to install a satellite ground station in Chatumel.293 The AEM 
started with an annual budget of US$800,000 and is not expected to rise above US$8 
million.294 Thus, progress will be slow on activities not directly related to the acquisition 
of GEO satellites.  
Like its South American counterparts, Mexico’s space program is focused 
inwardly on development. Mexico’s planned acquisition of two Boeing satellite indicates 
                                                 
290 Agencia Espacial Mexicana, Programa Nacional de Actividades Espacial 2011–2015 [National 
Program of Space Activities 2011–2015] (México, D.F.: Secretaría de Comunicaciones y Transportes, 
2012), 8–9. 
291 Agencia Espacial Mexicana, “Establece AEM Alianza Estratégica Con Nasa Para Desarrollo de 
Proyectos Con Uso de Telecomunicaciones Espaciales [AEM Establishes a Strtegic Alliance with NASA to 
Develop Space Telecommunications Projects,” December 8, 2014, 
http://www.aem.gob.mx/notas/alianzaEstrategica.html. 
292 RIA Novosti, “Mexico to Create Its First Space Center on Yucatan Peninsula,” April 22, 2010, 
http://en.ria.ru/world/20100422/158694450.html. 
293 Xinhua Español, “Operará Agencia Espacial Mexicana Antena de Telecomunicación Satelital [The 
Mexican Space Program Will Operate a Satellite Communications Antenna],” Xinhua, August 10, 2014, 
http://spanish.xinhuanet.com/tec/2014-08/10/c_133544890.htm. 
294 Antonio Regalado, “Mexico Gets a Space Agency,” Science, April 22, 2010, 
http://news.sciencemag.org/2010/04/mexico-gets-space-agency. 
 71 
Mexico’s desire to improve its internal security. International outreach serves two 
purposes: it improves diplomatic relationships and is essential for the AEB to meet its 
stated goals. The AEM is a national-level space program that integrates its goals with the 
broader development goals of the nation. UNAMSAT-B, Mexico’s first foray into the 
LEO realm, demonstrated the ability of Mexican higher education to construct a satellite 
in house, with some outside assistance with design. Mexico has also been active in 
procuring and maintaining GEO satellite capability, but has not attempted to move 
beyond procurement. Finally, Mexico has not announced any desire to pursue launch 
capability. 
D. PERU 
While Robert H. Goddard is credited with building and launching the first liquid-
fueled rocket, historical evidence points to Peruvian scientist Pedro Paulet as the first to 
conceive of the liquid motor design in 1895.295 In 1910, Paulet helped found the Liga Pro 
Aviación (Pro-Aviation League) that eventually became the Fuerza Aérea del Peru 
(Peruvian Air Force, FAP). Though Paulet’s invention forms the foundation of modern 
rocketry today, Peru’s accomplishments in space have been modest. 
In 1974, Peru established the Comisión Nacional de Investigación y Desarrollo 
Aeroespacial (National Commission of Aerospace Research and Development, 
CONIDA). According to Law 20643, the purpose of CONIDA is five-fold: promote the 
peaceful use of space in Peru, conduct research with domestic and foreign partners, form 
collaborative agreements with other national and international space institutions, facilitate 
technology transfer and the development of human capital, and identify ways to use space 
technology to promote development and enhance security in Peru.296 The final purpose 
hints at the close connection between CONIDA and the Peruvian Ministry of Defense. A 
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look at the current leaders of CONIDA confirms this—most are active FAP officers.297 
CONIDA established a sounding rocket launch site at Punta Lobos (operated by the 
FAP), just south of Lima, and began collaborating with NASA on upper atmospheric 
research. Over the next decade, Peru participated in several sounding rocket campaigns 
with NASA including Project ANTARQUI (1975) and Project CONDOR (1983).298  
By the mid-1980s, the Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) had begun terrorizing the 
countryside, and border tensions between Ecuador and Peru erupted in armed conflict. 
During Fujimori’s quasi-authoritarian regime, Abimael Guzmán, the leader of the 
Sendero Luminoso, was captured, drastically reducing the violence in the countryside. 
Peru also settled its border dispute with Ecuador after a brief armed conflict in 1995 
(Cenepa War). President Fujimori attempted to purchase Scud-C missiles from North 
Korea but later abandoned the effort.299 These struggles shrank space budgets, slowing 
progress on sounding rocket and satellite development. As an example, in 1997 CONIDA 
began designing a remote-sensing satellite, dubbed CONIDASAT. Due to budget 
constraints the team developed most of the components in house; however, the project 
was cancelled due to lack of funds in 2003.300 
In the mid-2000s, Peru placed renewed emphasis on remote sensing. In 2005, 
Peru joined the Chinese-led Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organization (APSCO). 
APSCO is an international organization that, according to its website, promotes the 
peaceful use of space among its member states by cooperating on Earth observation and 
disaster management, space science research, and technology development.301 The 
current member states are Bangladesh, China, Iran, Mongolia, Pakistan, Peru, Thailand, 
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and Turkey. Membership in the organization gives members access to imagery of their 
own territories from the Small Multi-Mission Satellite Project.302 Currently, this project 
consists of one satellite (HJ-1A) that successfully launched on 6 September 2008.303 In 
preparation to receive and disseminate satellite data, Peru established the Centro 
Nacional de Operación de Imágenes de Satélite (National Center for Satellite Imagery 
Operations) in 2006.304 The Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of the Environment are 
the prime users of satellite imagery, which is not surprising considering the continuing 
threat from drug trafficking organizations and illegal mining activities.  
Peru’s desire for its own imaging satellite is the focus of its recent activity. In 
April of 2014, the Peruvian Ministry of Defense announced its intention to purchase an 
Earth-observing satellite from Airbus Defense and Space for US$213 million.305 This has 
generated some controversy within Peru due to the high cost and the allegations that the 
negotiations violated Peru’s laws for transparency. Chile purchased the Astrosat-100 for 
US$72 million. Although the Astrosat-300 is more capable, some have questioned the 
large price difference. Others indicated that the sub-meter resolution of the satellite 
actually inhibits the use of the satellite for the large-area observations required to detect 
illegal activities, like illegal fishing.306 The high-resolution requirement appears to be 
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driven by technical requirements deemed classified by the FAP.307 In addition, Peru will 
gain access to imagery from six French satellites during the lifetime of the satellite.308 
The lack of transparency surrounding this satellite deal seems to reverse the vision 
expressed in Peru’s space policy released in 2009. According to Harding, La Política 
Espacial del Perú (The Space Policy of Peru) appeared to diminish the role of the 
Peruvian military in the space program. The plan stated that “without science and 
technology the country cannot achieve development…and without development there is 
no security.”309 At the time of this writing, this document no longer appears on 
CONIDA’s website, nor can any archived copy of it be found on the Internet. The 
document also does not appear to have been superseded by a new strategic plan. Given 
that CONIDA remains subordinate to the Ministry of Defense, it is clear that the military 
remains a key driver of the space program.  
This is evident in the continued development of sounding rockets and CONIDA’s 
potential collaboration with USSOUTHCOM. On 12 June 2013, Peru launched the first 
Paulet 1-B rocket, reaching an altitude of 15 kilometers. The Paulet 1-B is the first 
sounding rocket completely designed and built using Peruvian technology. The head of 
CONIDA at the time, Major General Mario Pimentel Higueras, stated that by 2020, 
CONIDA plans to test a rocket capable of attaining 300 kilometers in altitude as a 
stepping stone to having a launcher with orbital capability.310 As mentioned in the 
previous chapter, Peru, Brazil, and Chile have expressed interest in participating with 
USSOUTHCOM on the SNaP-3 satellite program.  
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Like other Latin American countries, Peruvian universities are experimenting 
with small satellites. The Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú (Pontifical Catholic 
University of Peru, PUCP) constructed Peru’s first two satellites to enter orbit. 
Constructed by the Instituto de Radioastronomía (Radio Astronomy Institute, INRAS), 
PUCP-SAT 1 used a CubeSat design and carried an even smaller satellite, Pocket-PUCP, 
to be deployed on orbit. The INRAS team integrated both satellites aboard the Italian 
Unisat-5, which was successfully launched aboard a Russian Dnepr rocket from the 
Dombarovsky Cosmodrome on 24 October 2013.  
Within a year of the launch of PUCP-SAT 1, Peru experienced a flurry of small 
satellite success. On 9 January 2014 UAPSAT-1 launched from NASA’s Wallops Island 
aboard an Orbital Sciences Antares rocket. Students and professors at Universidad Alas 
Peruanas (Peruvian Wings University, UAP) designed the satellite. Most recently, a team 
from the Universidad Nacional de Ingeniería (National University of Engineering) 
repeated this success with the deployment of another CubeSat, Chasqui-1, deployed by a 
cosmonaut on the ISS on 18 August 2014.311 
Although Peru established CONIDA in 1974, progress along the Space 
Technology Ladder has been slow due to internal and external conflict. Despite this, 
Peru’s focused approach has produced results, especially in gaining access to satellite 
imagery. Peru’s universities are also using small satellites to build human capital to 
support space operations. 
E. CHILE 
Like Brazil, early Chilean space activities began with satellite tracking stations. In 
1959, the University of Chile created the Centro de Estudios Espaciales (Center for 
Space Studies) as part of an agreement with NASA to assist with satellite tracking. This 
became the center’s specialty for over 40 years, supporting many NASA missions 
including those in the Apollo series.312 Unlike in Brazil, however, the Chilean military 
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did not have a prominent role in space during Chile’s military dictatorship from 1973 to 
1989. In May of 1991, the Fuerza Aérea de Chile (Chilean Air Force, FACh) created the 
Centro de Estudios Aeronáuticos y del Espacio (Center of Aeronautics and Space 
Studies). This center represents Chile’s first national space office. The University 
continued its collaboration with NASA. 
Rather than pursue launcher technology, the FAch announced in March of 1994 
its intention to create the first Chilean-built satellite, FASat-Alfa (Fuerza Aérea 
Satélite).313 The FACh contracted with Surrey Satellite Technology Limited (SSTL) to 
build the satellite, transferring the technology to Chile and arranging graduate-level 
training for 15 Chilean engineers.314 The satellite carried several scientific payloads, 
including an ozone-monitoring sensor and two camera systems.315 Unfortunately, the 
satellite failed to deploy on orbit and was lost. The FACh contracted to produce the 
identical FASat-Bravo. This satellite launched from the Baikonur Cosmodrome on 10 
July 1998 and operated successfully for three years before its batteries failed.316 
In 2001, working on the recommendation of a space exploratory committee led by 
the FACh, President Lagos signed the decree creating the Agencia Chilena del Espacio 
(Chilean Space Agency [ACE]) as a presidential advisory committee. According to the 
decree, the primary function of ACE was to promote the internal development of the 
country, to demonstrate Chile’s intentions to use space peacefully, and to promote 
international outreach in space. Like the AEB, ACE unites a multi-ministry committee 
across the Chilean government to coordinate space activities. Although led by the head of 
the Comisión Nacional de Investigación Científica y Tecnológica (National Commission 
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of Scientific and Technological Research), a civilian, the agency depended of the FACh 
for its technical and administrative support.317 
ACE successfully procured an Earth-observing satellite through its Sistema 
Satelital de Observación Terrestre (Earth Observing Satellite System [SSOT]) program. 
The FACh contracted with EADS for US$72 million to develop and launch the satellite 
known as FASat-charlie.318 The package deal also included establishing a grounds 
station, as well as allowing Chilean engineers to participate with EADS in the 
development of the satellite.319 The satellite launched successfully into a LEO orbit from 
French Guyana on 17 December 2011. The system provides high-resolution images for 
military intelligence and civilian purposes, including management of agricultural lands 
and disaster monitoring.320 
 Chilean universities have also pursued small satellite projects. In 1994, the 
Universidad de La Frontera started work on the Chile Satélite de Aficionados a las 
Radiocomunicaciones (Chilean Satellite for Radio Communications Aficionados) or 
AMSAT-CE as it came to be known. The projected total cost of the satellite development 
was $575,000; however, it appears that the project is now defunct. The University of 
Chile is also developing a micro-satellite called SUCHAI (Satellite of the University of 
Chile for Aerospace Investigation). As of the latest status update in May 2014, the team 
traveled to INPE, in Brazil, to run preliminary acceptance tests; however, no launch 
provider has been announced.321 
In 2012, the political difficulties of ACE began to surface in the press. In January 
of 2012, El Mercurio, a Chilean newspaper, reported that ACE no longer had a budget, 
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and its employees had been reassigned to other tasks.322 According to the news report, 
the first Bachelet administration did not properly publish the decree officially transferring 
ACE to civilian control, making it invalid. Inexplicably, the Piñera adminstration took no 
immediate action to correct the error. By mid 2013, ACE no longer had a presence on the 
Internet.323 In September of 2013, the Ministério de Transportes and 
Telecomunicaciones (Ministry of Transportation and Telecommunications, MTT) 
announced a public forum, in association with a multi-ministry effort, to discuss the 
future of the Chilean space program. In the resulting document Política Nacional 
Espacial 2014–2020, the Subsecretaría de Telecomunicaciones (Subsecretariat of 
Telecommunications) published this new vision for space development: 
By the year 2020, Chile will be a country that effectively takes advantage 
of the economic and social benefits from the use of space, with greater 
opportunities to develop knowledge, innovation, and entrepreneurship in 
space science and technology, with an environment conducive for progress 
in these activities and with space applications at the service of citizens, the 
workforce, and the government.324 
To this end, Chile will pursue three paths. First, it will address the issues that led to the 
failure of ACE by creating a long-term vision for development and reforming the 
institutional and regulatory environment that impeded progress toward that vision.325 The 
report suggests that due to its status as a presidential advisory committee ACE had 
limited authority to direct space activities across ministries. Second, it will provide 
incentives to industry to participate in space projects, increasing innovation and 
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entrepreneurship.326 Finally, it will boost human resources by increasing opportunities to 
obtain specialized degrees, training users of space products, and encouraging research 
(similar to the success Chile enjoys with astronomy research).327 
On 29 March 2013, Chile established a new space policy committee called the 
Consejo de Ministros para el Desarrollo Digital y Espacial (Council of Ministers for 
Digital and Space Development).328 Although Michelle Bachelet took office as President 
of Chile on 11 March 2014, President Piñera signed this decree into law prior to leaving 
office. The Council of Ministers met for the first time on 27 August 2014 and again on 29 
September 2014.329 The process of charting a long-term vision for the Chilean space 
program is progressing slowly. Chile represents a case of a country that has regressed on 
the Space Technology Ladder. 
Since the dissolution of ACE in 2012, the FACh has continued FASAT-charlie 
operations; however, efforts to procure a replacement when its projected operational 
lifetime ends in 2016 are on hold.330 The long delay means the FACh will have 
benefitted entirely from the commercial sale of images from the satellite. According to 
the Servicio Aerofotogramétrico (Aerophotogrametric Service) run by the FACh, FASAT-
charlie prices range from US$ 0.76 to US$3.50 per square kilometer depending on the 
image resolution and total image area.331  
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As Arturo Sotomayor observed with Latin America nuclear policy, Latin 
American space policy is best understood by examining the economic system, the state of 
civil-military relations, and domestic politics—all directly influence foreign policy.332 
The discussion of Brazil’s space program in chapter two introduced three broad themes 
that frame the activities these programs. First, economic development is the primary 
motivation of these programs. Second, domestic politics matter most when considering 
the regional and international orientation of these programs. In addition to these broad 
themes, several smaller recurring themes emerged from the discussion of these programs. 
Table 3 summarizes the relevance of these smaller themes to Brazil and the programs 
discussed in this chapter. This section discusses these smaller recurring themes within the 
context of the broader themes based on their domestic, regional, and international 
influence on Latin American space programs. 
1. Domestic Factors 
All Latin American space programs have at their core the desire to harness space 
capabilities to further economic development. Each country uses satellite imagery to 
manage its territory; however, six out of 10 Latin American Space programs have made 
an effort to acquire some form of Earth-observation capability, either acquiring an 
indigenous capacity or establishing a collaboration. Half have also acquired at least one 
GEO communications satellite, while the rest subscribe to international providers. These 
technologies help overcome the challenging geography of Central and South America, 
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Table 3.   Summary of recurring domestic, regional, and international themes 























































Space program during military 
dictatorship 
       1 4  
Space program during armed 
internal conflict 
          
Space program during armed 
external conflict  
          
Military Participation in Space 
Program 
          
Civilian Space Agencies           
Academia micro-satellite 
projects 
          
“Pink Tide” Countries           
Sounding rocket program          
Collaboration with NASA during 
1960s & 1970s 
          
Collaboration with China        2   
Collaboration with Europe           
Collaboration with Russia           
Collaboration with U.S. post 
1985 
   3    3   
Members of UN Conference on 
Disarmament 
          
1
 President Fujimori’s regime is counted for this purpose 
2
 Through participation in APSCO 
3 
Potentially through SNaP-3 
4
 Military has minimal influence 
Domestic politics also lead Latin American countries to pursue different strategies 
for development. Brazil and Argentina relied heavily on inward-looking ISI policies 
during military rule.333 These policies still influence economic policy today, albeit to a 
lesser degree. Their space programs place a strong emphasis on technology transfer and 
autonomy. Mexico and Chile, however, more recently have opened their economies to 
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foreign investment and have free-trade agreements with the United States.334 Venezuela, 
Ecuador and Bolivia, use revenues generated from a booming commodity market to fuel 
their ideological goals.335 Bolivia and Venezuela simply purchased space capability with 
these revenues.  
The degree to which civilians direct the action of the space program is an 
indication of democratic consolidation in these countries. Chile, for example, is working 
to eliminate some of the prerogatives its military enjoyed before and during the Pinochet 
regime. Among these prerogatives, the Copper Law (1958) funneled to the military 10 
percent revenues generated from copper exports by Chile’s state-owned copper company, 
CODELCO. This gave the Chilean military autonomy from domestic politics that become 
threatened by the specter of socialism, prompting the overthrow of Allende government 
in 1973. Since the end of the Pinochet regime in 1989, the Chilean democracy has 
steadily exerted control over the military.336 The decision to dissolve ACE and reform it 
under civilian control is another step in a long process of redefining the role of the 
military in Chile; however, it appears the military is contesting this decision. In 
Argentina, the new democracy also drastically reduced the military’s involvement in the 
space program as part of its transition to democracy. In Peru, however, the space agency 
resides within the ministry of defense, giving the military considerable leverage over its 
activities. Although this thesis does not classify the Ecuadorian Civilian Space Agency as 
a national-level agency (see the appendix), the military essentially funds Ecuador’s 
program as a contractor for space activities.  
Latin American countries simply do not have the resources to sustain war for very 
long. Thus, the traditional role of the military of protecting the country from armed 
external threats has lost its relevance. Latin American militaries in countries with no 
internal conflict have struggled to redefine their roles. For countries like Argentina, 
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Brazil, Ecuador, and Peru the space program provides a way for the military to stay 
relevant. After its humiliation in the Falklands/Malvinas War, the Argentine military 
increased it efforts to develop a ballistic missile as one avenue for maintaining relevance. 
The Brazilian military maintains its role in the space program and has diversified into 
peacekeeping operations. After the resolution of the Cenepa War, Ecuador’s military 
competed with the police for internal security work.337 The Ecuadorian military also 
operates the national airline, and its heavy involvement in Ecuador’s “civilian” space 
program is further evidence of its efforts to define new missions.  
This does not mean that Latin America lacks violence. On the contrary, all Latin 
American countries struggle with crime to some degree, and some deal with internal 
armed conflict. Countries with ongoing internal conflicts like Colombia, Mexico, and 
Peru also gain from space. In Mexico, the police force is fragmented across federal, state, 
and municipal lines, giving rise to roughly 2,000 different police forces, which do not 
communicate well with one another.338 By placing government communications on a 
common network, Mexsat-1 and 2 can potentially unify the actions of its police forces 
and the military in the struggle against organized crime. Peru’s emphasis on Earth-
observation gives the military tools in its effort to combat illicit coca cultivation and the 
remnants of the Sendero Luminoso. While Colombia has not chosen to invest in its own 
Earth-observing assets, it benefits from international space assets in its internal struggle 
against the insurgent group Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarios de Colombia 
(Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, FARC) and drug trafficking organizations. 
As Latin American democracies assert more control over the military, the military 
must compete for funding with another type of internal threat: “widening poverty, 
unemployment, declining social welfare services, and so on.”339 This directly impacts 
space programs with direct military participation, as in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, 
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and Peru. Even the civilian side of these space programs suffers from the same lack of 
electoral incentives that lead politicians to disregard military policy. 
Finally, for Bolivia and Venezuela, space development is also tied to bolstering 
support for populist leaders. As mentioned earlier, President Chávez used VENESAT-1 to 
expand the reach of his Bolivarian revolution to rural communities in Venezuela and 
even spread his message beyond Venezuela’s borders. President Morales recently touted 
that subscription costs for satellite television and some Internet service plans have been 
cut in half after the TKSAT-1 came into service, bolstering his populist image.340 The 
satellite purchases also express these regimes’ desires to minimize U.S. influence by 
reaching out to China, an ideologically similar nation. 
2. Regional and International Factors 
While rare, interstate conflict has occurred in Latin America. Participating in 
interstate conflict would reasonably impart realist motives for developing space 
capabilities. While the military strongly influences Peru’s space program, Peru’s space 
activities appear to be directed at detecting illicit activities within its borders and only 
involve Ecuador to the extent these illicit activities cross the border. Ecuador and Peru 
enjoy positive bilateral relations at present.341 In contrast, Argentina’s defeat in the 
Falklands/Malvinas War intensified the military’s efforts to acquire ballistic missiles. As 
discussed in this chapter, President Menem’s reforms quashed the geopolitical motivation 
of the space program. 
Regional cooperation in Latin America in space has been hindered first by the 
initial lack of expertise, and, second, by a lack of leadership. Early in the space age, 
Argentina and Brazil had the greatest opportunity to collaborate due to the similarity in 
their technological level and geographic proximity. During the period of military 
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governance and rivalry, however, both looked to acquire technology from more advanced 
space-faring nations. As the programs of Argentina and Brazil have matured, the 
opportunities to lead at the regional level have increased. Both Argentina and Brazil have 
ties with other regional space programs. As mentioned in chapter two, the rise of the New 
Left has led to the creation of new regional multilateral organizations. Thus, ALAS 
makes sense now, especially since opportunities to collaborate outside the region have 
decreased. 
International forces can aid and inhibit space programs. Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, 
Mexico, and Peru all benefitted from cooperation with NASA in the infancy of the space 
age on satellite tracking, space research, and sounding rocket projects. While Chile 
remained a center for international cooperation in astronomy, cooperation with the U.S. 
on other space projects diminished across Latin America for several reasons. For 
Argentina and Brazil, the dual nuclear and sounding rocket programs sparked fears of an 
arms race, triggering a response from the international community. U.S. intervention to 
prevent the transfer of missile and nuclear technology ran afoul of two cherished norms 
in Latin America—sovereignty and equality between states.342 Furthermore, many 
military regimes resorted to isolationism to avoid censure for human rights violations.343 
In the Andean nations, U.S. collaborations tend to focus more on combating drug 
trafficking organizations and insurgency.344 Since the transition to democracy, Argentina 
enjoyed the most successful collaboration with the Unites States; however, this 
collaboration is in danger of ending under the Kirchner regime.  
The rise of the New Left has also prompted Latin American countries to diversify 
their economic interests. In 2005, the United States consumed 36 percent of all exports 
from the region.345 By 2012, this share had shrunk to 25 percent, while Asia’s share 
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increased from 13 percent to 23 percent in the same period.346 This is seen in their 
outreach in space as well. Latin American space programs favor contracts and 
collaborations that result in the transfer of technology and the development of human 
capital. While U.S. universities play an active role in educating space professionals 
worldwide, export control laws limit the scope of potential projects available to U.S. 
companies and government agencies. Even when Latin American Universities have 
succeeded in constructing a small satellite, they almost exclusively rely on Russia to 
launch them into space. Thus, the outreach to China, Europe, and Russia is not solely an 
expression of anti-U.S. sentiment—it is a matter of necessity to gain access to more 
advanced technology, Furthermore, China’s “no political strings” policy respects Latin 
American sovereignty.347 
Finally, while not all Latin American nations are members of the CD, all Latin 
American nations approve the yearly UN PAROS resolution. The vote, however, is 
largely symbolic since the CD is deadlocked.348 Given the reputation of Latin America as 
a norms entrepreneur, the time may be right for the region to adopt a “Treaty of 
Tlatelolco” for space cooperation. Although the proposed ALAS does not list this as one 
of its aims, the alliance could lead to a clearer definition of these norms than the great 
powers are willing to propose. 
G. CONCLUSION 
This chapter reviewed the space programs of Argentina, Chile, Mexico, Peru, and 
Venezuela, giving enough historical detail to assess each program’s progress along the 
Space Technology Ladder and identifying the major domestic, regional, and international 
factors in each. Table 4 summarizes the progress of each program on the Space 
Technology Ladder. 
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13   ☐        
12 ☐  ☐        
11           
10           
9           
8           
7           
6           
5           
4          ☐ 
3        ☐   
2    ☐       
1           
- complete; ☐ - projected within 5 years;  - micro-satellite 
 
Argentina and Brazil lead Latin America in space development. The countries are also 
closely matched in capability, with Argentina ahead in GEO satellite capability and 
Brazil further ahead with launcher capability. Beyond Argentina and Brazil, space 
capabilities drop off quickly. Other programs are focused on specific development goals, 
like communication and Earth-observing satellites. All programs are working to train 
space professionals, even including training as part of procurement contracts. Many Latin 
America universities are also training engineers through small satellite development 
projects. Chile is awaiting the launch of their micro-satellite. All the rest succeeded in 
securing flights launching from Russian spaceports. 
 The experiences of these programs also validate the developmental focus of the 
programs; the primacy of domestic politics, including civil-military relations; and, the 
positive and negative aspects of international influence. The final chapter of this thesis 
examines the implications for U.S. space policy in the region, specifically addressing 
what can be done to increase engagement on space projects.  
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If Keohane and Nye are correct and interdependence among nations eventually 
overcomes geopolitics and fosters peaceful relations on Earth, then the same complex 
interdependence in space could also solve many of the space security issues faced today. 
The United States has enjoyed an unparalleled freedom to operate independently in 
space. Not surprisingly, it is reluctant to give up those freedoms without a clear guarantee 
of security. The National Space Policy released by the Obama administration in 2010 
signaled a change toward a more international approach to space security; however, this 
vision faces many challenges domestically and internationally.349 The domestic political 
deadlock in the U.S. Senate makes it unlikely that the Unites States will enter into any 
binding treaties governing the norms of space. Internationally, the Unites States and 
Israel oppose the Chinese-Russian PPWT proposal since it lacks a means to verify 
compliance.350 As Moltz argues, attempting to retain complete independence is not a 
sustainable strategy in space any more than it is on Earth.351 The United States must 
engage the international community on this issue more effectively.  
The United States now faces the reality of 10 space programs in Latin America, 
with Argentina and Brazil nearing launch capability. One troubling trend that emerged 
from the previous chapters is the limited engagement that the United States currently has 
with Latin American space programs. While collaborations with China, Russia, and 
Europe have been an overall positive influence in Latin American space programs, the 
United States should also be strengthening partnerships through peaceful cooperation in 
science and technology. Many Latin American militaries still participate in space 
activities, opening a military-to-military avenue of collaboration. Also, for the past two 
decades stringent U.S. export control regulations have encouraged foreign countries to 
avoid the United States as an international collaborator. These restrictions along with the 
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rise of the New Left have driven the trend of Chinese and European outreach to Latin 
America in space. The stiff fines for non-compliance discourage many U.S. citizens and 
companies from dealing with the export control process entirely. This has limited the 
scope of educational opportunities at U.S. universities as Latin American countries seek 
training for their space professionals. The recent revision of U.S. export control laws 
promises to remove many of these barriers. This last chapter examines how the Unites 
States can increase its engagement in Latin American space programs in the military, 
commercial, and civilian realms with the goal of increasing space security through 
interdependence.  
A. MILITARY COOPERATION 
As discussed earlier, the period of military rule limited the opportunities to 
collaborate in space. Not all Latin American countries had space programs during this 
period, and the ones that did isolated themselves due to their poor human rights records. 
Since the return to democracy, Latin American militaries have largely been stripped of 
their leadership roles in their national space programs, albeit civilian control is tenuous in 
some cases. USSOUTHCOM already collaborates with Latin American on a broad range 
of security issues, including combating drug trafficking organizations, humanitarian 
assistance, and peacekeeping.352 The rise of the New Left has hampered military-to-
military cooperation in Argentina and Venezuela; however, the United States Armed 
Forces maintains close ties with other militaries of New Left administrations. For 
example, even though the Correa administration refused to renew the lease on Manta Air 
Base in Ecuador, Ecuador still receives assistance in removing anti-personnel mines and 
the Ecuadorian Navy participates in the UNITAS PAC naval exercise. Thus, even when 
diplomatic relationships are strained, the military can provide an avenue for cooperation.    
USSOUTHCOM’s outreach with the SNaP-3 satellite is a step in the right 
direction. As seen previously in Table 3, small satellite development is a common 
stepping stone to training space professionals for larger projects. The satellite has 
capabilities similar to Brazil’s data collecting satellites. The SNaP-3 system can 
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communicate with ground sensors and can also relay data to military units beyond the 
line of sight.353 All of these capacities are useful in Latin America’s rugged terrain. Peru, 
Brazil, and Chile have expressed interest in participating with USSOUTHCOM to test 
SNaP-3 capabilities in the field once new satellites are launched by the United States in 
2015.  
The military is also positioned well to assist Latin American countries train space 
professionals. To foster these educational opportunities, USSOUTHCOM, in conjunction 
with the Naval Postgraduate School and the Air Force Institute of Technology, should 
reach out to sponsor foreign officers to receive graduate instruction in space systems 
engineering and remote sensing. Both institutions have programs that would meet the 
needs of these students. The relaxation of export controls may provide opportunities to 
expand foreign participation in these degree programs. USSOUTHCOM, in conjunction 
with the Air Force Office of Scientific Research, the Office of Naval Research, and the 
Army Research, should also coordinate faculty exchanges with Latin American aerospace 
programs. Prime candidate institutions would include Brazil’s ITA and Argentina’s IIAE. 
 The classified nature of U.S. space operations complicates military operational 
exchanges; however, to the extent possible, officer exchanges could enhance the 
professionalism of Latin American space operators. These exchanges could take on 
several forms. Latin American space launch officers could be invited to observe 
unclassified launch operations and learn launch safety procedures. To aid information 
sharing, it may be possible to establish Latin American liaison elements with the Joint 
Space Operations Center. This could be the beginning of establishing partnerships to 
enhance space situational awareness (SSA) networks in Central and South America. 
Chile, for example, has many locations suitable for optical monitoring of the space 
environment. 
The United States also has an interest in building alliances with Latin American 
space programs to help support its vision of international space security and governance. 
                                                 
353 Kenneth Stewart, “Naval Postgraduate School - Southcom Turns to NPS to Evaluate CubeSats for 




Brazil is an active participant in space diplomacy at the CD. Increased cooperation with 
Brazil on space projects will facilitate Brazil-U.S. dialogue on security issues including 
the CoC and PPWT. Brazil and other Latin American nations should also be encouraged 
to define the norms for peaceful space cooperation among themselves as they pursue 
ALAS. This could lead to a “Treaty of Tlatelolco” for space norms. Strengthening ties 
with Brazil and Mexico will also help maintain Central and South America as a zone of 
peace. 
B. COMMERCIAL COOPERATION 
The United States government has long relied on a cumbersome system to prevent 
the export of sensitive military or dual-use items or services. The Arms Export Control 
Act (AECA) and the Export Administration Act of 1979 form the legal framework for the 
system. The AECA gives the President of the United States the authority to restrict the 
export of items and services related to defense. The State Department implements this 
authority via the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR). To accomplish this, 
the State Department maintains the United States Munitions List (USML), which 
identifies all military items and services that cannot be exported. The Export 
Administration Act of 1979 tasks the Department of Commerce with controlling the 
export of sensitive dual-use technologies. The Department of Commerce implements this 
authority through the Export Administration Regulations, which, in turn, creates, the 
Commerce Control List (CCL) that identifies restricted dual-use technologies. The CCL 
also implements the restrictions stipulated by several nonproliferation regimes, including 
the MTCR.354 
The U.S. space industry has been harmed by these regulations. As the military 
relied more on commercial technology for acquisitions, the USML and the CCL began to 
overlap, creating ambiguities.355 Furthermore, in 1999, the U.S. government moved all 
satellites and components to USML Category 15 (Spacecraft Systems and Related 
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Articles) after U.S. companies Loral and Hughes Space & Communications assisted 
China in discovering the root cause of the booster failure resulted in the loss of Intelsat 
708.356 The more restrictive USML inhibited the ability of U.S. satellite manufacturers to 
compete in the world market with the CGWIC and Airbus Group that both make ITAR-
free systems.357 From 1995 to 2005, the U.S. market share of satellite exports dropped 
from 73 percent to 25 percent.358 A report released by the Department of Commerce 
estimates the U.S. space industry suffered between US$988 million and US$2 billion in 
lost sales opportunities from 2009 to 2012 (compiled from the data supplied by 995 
respondents to the study).359  
The impact on Latin America is difficult to assess. Export controls did not prevent 
Boeing from collaborating with Mexico on the Mexsat satellite series, nor did they 
prevent Argentina from collaborating with NASA on the SAC satellite series. While U.S. 
export controls contributed to the rise of Chinese space cooperation in the region, 
domestic political considerations likely eliminated U.S. companies from serious 
consideration. U.S. companies likely had no chance to compete with China for the 
VENESAT-1 contract given the political landscape in Venezuela at the time. Clearly, 
export controls limit the scope of potential projects and require both a U.S. and foreign 
entity willing to comply with the costly regulations.  
Additionally, many of the impacts of export control are hard to measure. In the 
absence of U.S. suppliers, Brazil, Peru and others had no other recourse but to develop 
their own industrial base or import satellites from other countries. Many U.S. universities 
refuse to participate in ITAR-restricted projects as they limit the participation of their 
foreign students in educational opportunities and restrict the ability of faculty members to 
                                                 
356 Bureau of Industry and Security, U.S. Space Industry “Deep Dive” Assessment: Impact of U.S. 
Export Controls on the Space Industrial Base (Washington, D.C.: Department of Commerce, 2014), 42. 
357 OECD, The Space Economy at a Glance 2014 (Paris, France: OECD Publishing, 2014), 29, 
http://public.eblib.com/choice/PublicFullRecord.aspx?p=1870780. 
358 Morgan Dwyer et al., “The Global Impact of ITAR on the For-Profit and Non-Profit Space 
Communities,” in Proceedings of the 25th Symposium on Space Policy, Regulations and Economics 
(Naples, Italy: International Astronautical Federation, 2012), 9, http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/80837. 
359 Bureau of Industry and Security, U.S. Space Industry “Deep Dive” Assessment, 28. 
 94 
disseminate their research, especially non-U.S. faculty members.360 Thus, export controls 
limit the U.S. ability to train and otherwise cooperate with Latin American space 
professionals.  
In 2009, the Obama administration announced the Export Control Reform 
Initiative. Part of this reform included the revision of USML Category 15. Now, all 
satellites with a specific military or intelligence mission remain in the USML, but the 
following have been moved to the CCL: 
Communications satellites that do not contain classified components; 
remote sensing satellites with performance parameters below certain 
thresholds; and, systems, subsystems, parts, and components associated 
with these satellites and with performance parameters below certain 
thresholds specified for items remaining on the USML.361 
These new rules went into effect on 10 November 2014. Reaction to the new rules 
has been mixed. On one hand, the CCL and USML retain separate lists and significant 
restrictions still remain.362 On the other hand, the industry is cautiously optimistic about 
regaining some of the world market share of satellites.363 The potential benefit to Latin 
America is also mixed. According to the Commerce department report, Brazil and 
Mexico are among the top 20 destinations for U.S. space-related exports; however, 
neither is eligible for the Strategic Trade Authorization license exception, which 
eliminates much of the regulatory overhead on U.S. companies.364 As a way forward, the 
U.S. satellite industry should consider adopting the Chinese model of coordinating 
graduate education in space systems in conjunction with large satellite purchases. Within 
                                                 
360 Dwyer et al., “The Global Impact of ITAR,” 13–15. 
361 Reid Whitten, “ECR Episode XI: Rewriting the Guide to the Galaxy – Satellites Passed to 
Commerce Control,” The National Law Review, accessed November 10, 2014, 
http://www.natlawreview.com/article/ecr-episode-xi-rewriting-guide-to-galaxy-satellites-passed-to-
commerce-control. 
362 Jeff Foust, “Despite Reforms, U.S. Export Control Rules Remain Complicated,” Space News, 
November 1, 2014, http://www.spacenews.com/article/civil-space/42430despite-reforms-us-export-control-
rules-remain-complicated. 
363 Caleb Henry, “US State Department Finalizes Satellite Export Reform,” Via Satellite, November 
13, 2014, http://www.satellitetoday.com/regional/2014/11/13/us-state-department-finalizes-satellite-export-
reform/. 
364 Bureau of Industry and Security, U.S. Space Industry “Deep Dive” Assessment, 50–51. 
 95 
the limits of the remaining ITAR restrictions, U.S. corporations should engage Latin 
American countries on Earth-observing systems, which are in demand. U.S. space launch 
providers should also consider investing in Brazil’s CLA. The United States could 
encourage Brazil to consider leasing other sections of the CLA for foreign direct 
investment in GEO launch capability, as it has with ACS. Brazilian-SpaceX Corporation 
collaboration could be profitable. 
Micro-satellites are becoming popular in Latin America due to their low cost and 
rapid deployability. Universities use small satellite projects to educate aerospace 
engineers. Once built, these satellites need a ride into space. In 2011, the Federal 
Aviation Administration reported on an effort by the U.S. Army Space and Missile 
Defense Command (USASMDC) to develop a launcher capable of lofting a 10-kilogram 
payload into LEO for approximately US$1 million.365 This effort is similar to the 
Microsatellite Launch Vehicle currently under joint development by Brazil and Germany. 
Although it appears that the USASMDC effort has stalled, this capability could serve a 
niche market worldwide if developed. 
C. CIVILIAN COOPERATION 
As this thesis has demonstrated, formal government outreach between national 
space agencies and informal outreach via university-to-university collaborations and 
space interest groups (e.g. AMSAT) each play an important role in Latin America. 
Formal outreach to Brazil in civil space activity should be the keystone to a new U.S. 
Latin American space policy. Within the next five years Brazil should achieve launch 
capability and will be a leader among other South American space programs. The United 
States should encourage AEB-NASA collaboration on space projects, including 
reinvigorating the ISS collaboration; however, reviving Brazilian cooperation cannot be 
approached as a single issue. Diplomatically, Brazil’s goal is to secure a permanent seat 
on the UNSC. In space, Brazil wants to make the CLA a profitable launch center. The 
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two goals are linked. The United States must approach any invitation to participate in the 
ISS with this in mind. The CLA rests at the nexus of military, commercial, and civilian 
cooperation in space for Brazil. While the U.S. does not currently support Brazil in its bid 
for a permanent UNSC seat, the U.S. should look at ways to use the CLA for scientific 
research, even to the point of assisting with the VLS-1 vehicle. The VLS-1 poses no 
commercial threat to U.S. space launch providers and would allow Brazil to serve the 
growing small satellite market. Cooperation with Brazil on the VLS-1 may help thaw 
Argentine-U.S. relations enough to allow collaboration on the Tronador II. Close 
integration with these programs would allow the United States to satisfy any missile 
proliferation concerns. 
Collaboration on projects at the CLA would help mend past Brazil-U.S. tensions, 
and Brazil’s desire for permanent seat on the UNSC could motivate it to renew its 
commitment to the ISS. Collaboration should involve personnel exchanges with NASA, 
including new Brazilian astronauts. Unlike the previous attempt at ISS collaboration, the 
projects should be matched with Brazilian industrial capability. Of course, prior to any 
ISS collaboration, Brazil may opt for a joint satellite mission first. With the relaxed 
export control laws, the space of potential projects is broader. Eventually, the 
collaboration could include a joint robotic exploration mission with other Latin American 
partners as well. 
Opportunities for formal collaboration with the other major space programs in 
Latin America vary. Venezuela’s ABAE is a poor prospect for collaboration in space at 
present due to the anti-American posture of the current administration and a deepening 
economic crisis. Likewise, options for collaboration in Argentina are limited; however, 
NASA should maintain its ties to CONAE through the SAC-D Aquarius mission. NASA 
is already reaching out to Mexico’s AEM. NASA had contact with Chile’s ACE while it 
existed. In 2010, ACE contacted NASA to assist the team working to recover the 33 
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trapped miners.366 Once Chile reestablishes its space program, NASA should reestablish 
contact. 
Opportunities to collaborate formally with Latin America’s minor space programs 
are limited. This thesis classifies the programs of Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and 
Uruguay as minor space program due to the limited scope of their activities; however, 
they should not be ignored. Like Argentina and Venezuela, civilian collaboration with 
Bolivia’s ABE and Ecuador’s EXA may be problematic at present. For now, ABE’s sole 
focus is operating TKSAT-1. The legal mandate that established Ecuador’s EXA will 
expire in 2019, leaving an uncertain window of opportunity to collaborate even if 
domestic politics were favorable. Colombia has decided to hold off on purchasing 
satellites at present, focusing instead on leveraging foreign space capability while it 
attempts to end its internal conflict. Uruguay’s program focuses on space policy issues, 
making it a norm entrepreneur in Latin America. These programs would benefit more 
from the regional integration that ALAS promises to provide as well as informal outreach 
outside Latin America. 
The growing number of small satellite projects in Latin America illustrates the 
importance of informal outreach in space. Many Latin American universities have groups 
working on small satellite projects that could benefit from increased ties with U.S. 
universities. California Polytechnic State University, for example, collaborated with 
Colombia’s Universidad Sergio Arboleda to perform the flight qualification testing on its 
small satellite, Libertad-1. The burden of establishing informal connections falls to the 
universities themselves; however, national space agencies can do more to facilitate these 
efforts. The Department of Commerce report cited that many businesses do not 
understand export control regulations and are deterred by the complexity of the laws.367 
The same ambiguities threaten academic collaboration as well.368 NASA and the 
Department of State could facilitate informal outreach in space by providing 
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unambiguous guidance on the scope of space projects that are uninhibited by the revised 
ITAR restrictions. NASA could also help identify national or commercial launch 
opportunities that would permit small satellite “stowaways.” This is a difficulty that even 
American projects like SNaP-3 face. To date, the most common solution to this problem 
in Latin America is securing a ride aboard a Russian Dnepr rocket. 
Whether formal or informal, outreach to these countries should focus on what 
they need most—increased education and training opportunities to enlarge the pool of 
qualified space professionals. NASA has an international internship program for 
undergraduate and graduate students; however, Mexico is the only Latin American 
country with an agreement in place to participate.369 This avenue for collaboration should 
be extended to all Latin American space programs. Unambiguous ITAR guidance could 
also increase the realm of possibilities in informal outreach as well. 
D. CONCLUSION 
Latin America will develop space capabilities and the United States will have to 
choose the level of interaction it desires with these regional space programs. The current 
policy largely ignores them, which could lead to security dilemmas in the future. The best 
way to ensure smooth relations in the future is to collaborate now. This thesis has 
demonstrated that the raison d’être of Latin American space programs is to promote 
economic development. Coupled with Latin American norms of sovereignty and peaceful 
resolution of disputes, these space programs also promote a broader notion of national 
security than military power alone. To the extent that these programs exhibited 
geopolitical competition in the past, transitions to democracy have tempered that 
tendency. Understanding the domestic politics of each country is the key to 
understanding the regional and international orientation of the program. These 
motivations vary based on the current ideology in power and the chosen strategy for 
development. International collaboration has been a boon to these fledgling programs, but 
their unstable funding prevents them from gaining all they can from these collaborations. 
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While international nonproliferation regimes have hindered the progress of Argentina and 
Brazil, both are ready to take a leadership role among other Latin American space 
programs. The explosion of space activity in the developing world is exciting. With 
revised export control regulations, a greater emphasis on training and civilian 
engagement, and a smart use of military-to-military programs, the United States could 
pursue greater engagement in the region. The United States should not dismiss the 
opportunity to reach out to our space-faring neighbors in Latin America. 
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APPENDIX. MINOR LATIN AMERICAN SPACE PROGRAMS 
This appendix contains descriptive information about the smaller space programs 
in Latin America. Granted, this is a subjective distinction. The decision to classify the 
space programs of Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Colombia as minor space programs 
is based primarily on the limited scope of the activities of their space agencies. 
A. BOLIVIA 
Bolivia is Latin America’s newest entry into space. On 10 February 2010, 
President Evo Morales signed the decree creating the Agencia Boliviano Espacial 
(Bolivian Space Agency, ABE).370 The mission statement of the ABE details the very 
specific purpose for which it was created: “Manage and execute the implementation of 
the Tupac Katari Satellite Communications Project and other State space projects, such as 
assimilate, develop, and apply space knowledge to benefit all Bolivians.”371 ABE started 
with a budget of US$1.0 million.372 In August of that same year, Bolivia contracted with 
CGWIC to build Bolivia’s first telecommunications satellite TKSAT-1 (Túpac Katari 
Satellite). The name of the satellite is a tip-off to Bolivia’s purpose for pursuing the 
project. In 1780, Túpac Katari led a revolt against the Spanish in what is now Bolivia. 
The project aims not only to end Bolivia’s dependence on foreign communications 
satellites but also to extend telecommunication coverage to the entire country. The 
rugged terrain of Bolivia, like other Andean nations, drives up the cost of ground 
telecommunications infrastructure, resulting in the isolation of rural communities. An 
estimated 3.3 million Bolivians have no access to telecommunications at all.373 
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Bolivia contracted with CGWIC for a package deal that included the standard Chinese 
DFH-4 platform, launch services, and financing. The total project cost US$295.4 million, 
with US$44.3 million funded by the Bolivian treasury and the rest financed by the China 
Development Bank over 15 years.374 According to ABE, Bolivian companies paid 
upwards of US$10 million per year for bandwidth on foreign satellites.375 Given the 
estimated lifetime of 15 years for the satellite, it is unlikely that the Bolivian government 
will break even on the investment unless the customer base substantially increases. China 
successfully launched TKSAT-1 into GEO orbit on 21 December 2013. In April of 2014, 
President Morales claimed that satellite television subscriptions rates have dropped by 50 
percent, and Internet rates have dropped from 20 percent for low-bandwidth plans to 50 
percent for high-bandwidth plans. 
Notwithstanding President Morales’s anti-US rhetoric, Bolivia’s space program 
again illustrates the primary inward focus of these programs. Improving the quality of life 
for Bolivians helps reduce the instability that exists within Bolivia’s borders. Improving 
telecommunications forges a stronger link between disparate rural communities and the 
government. The international orientation of Bolivia’s space program is strongly 
influenced by Latin American norms. At first glance, the fact that ABE is exploring 
opportunities to cooperate with Argentina’s CONAE would indicate a realist orientation, 
given the historic rivalry between Argentina and Chile.376 In April of 2013, Bolivia filed 
a case against Chile in the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to require Chile to 
negotiate Bolivian access to the Pacific Ocean, which Bolivia lost as a result of the War 
of the Pacific (1879-83).377 Peru’s ICJ victory in January of 2014 against Chile in their 
maritime dispute likely encourages Bolivia. Bolivia is not currently pursuing military 
options to accomplish the same aim. Bolivia, however, also had a favorable response to 
Brazil’s proposal for ALAS. If formed, ALAS would bring Bolivia into cooperation with 
                                                 
374 Ibid. 
375 Agencia Efe, “Bolivia anuncia la creación de una agencia espacial [Bolivia Announces the 
Creation of a Space Agency],” El País, October 6, 2009, 
http://sociedad.elpais.com/sociedad/2009/10/06/actualidad/1254780011_850215.html. 
376 Comisión Nacional de Actividades Espaciales, “Visita Oficial.” 
377 International Court of Justice, “Contentious Cases,” accessed October 24, 2014, http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=3&case=153. 
 103 
Chile, which also responded favorably to the idea. Other foreign policy choices give 
further support to Bolivia’s normative orientation. Bolivia has taken a strong stance 
against U.S. counternarcotic influence within its borders, citing violations of its 
sovereignty.378 Coca cultivation is a source of income for Bolivia’s rural population. This 
reinforces the assertion that Bolivia is acting to improve the economic conditions of its 
citizens, which Bolivian history demonstrates is essential to staying in power. 
B. COLOMBIA 
Colombia’s 50-year struggle against the FARC, as well as the fights against drug 
trafficking, delayed Colombia’s entry into space. During the presidency of Álvaro Uribe, 
Colombia created a vision for a peaceful more equitable country by the year 2019, 
marking the 200
th
 year of Colombian independence. The vision was published in 2005 as 
Visión Colombia II Centenario: 2019. Although this plan focused on social issues, 
President Uribe signed Decree 2442 in 2006 creating the Commisión Colombiano del 
Espacio (Colombian Space Commission, CCE) in 2006. The first paragraph of this 
decree acknowledges the diverse roles that space can play in achieving Colombia’s 
development goals.379 
The Vice-President of Colombia heads the CCE and is joined by the head of 
various government ministries, with representation from the Fuerza Aérea Colombiana 
(Colombian Air Force, FAC), civil aviation, and other technical institutes. These 
representatives serve as voting members on the board. In addition, the board allows 
representatives from industry and academia to participate as non-voting members. At the 
same time, the decree established the Comité Técnico de Asuntos Espaciales (Space 
Technical Committee), which is responsible for making project proposals. This 
committee is composed of individuals designated by the voting members of the CCE.380 
The activities of the CCE are focused on seven areas: telecommunications, satellite 
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navigation, Earth observation; astronautics, astronomy, and space medicine; knowledge 
and research management; political and legal aspects of space; and, infrastructure for 
disseminating space data.381 Notably absent are any plans to develop space launch 
capabilities.  
The first success of Colombia in space cannot be entirely attributed to the CCE. In 
March of 2006, students at Universidad Sergio Arboleda completed the preliminary 
design of Libertad-1, using a CubeSat design. The project started as a teaching project, 
but soon had the support of the FAC, Colombian civil aviation, and industry. The 
California Polytechnic State University performed the acceptance tests, and the satellite 
successfully launched aboard a Dnepr rocket from the Baikonur Cosmodrome on 17 
April 2007.382 The radio beacon on the satellite functioned normally during its 34-day 
mission.383 
Progress toward other satellites has been very slow. In 2008, the CCE proposed 
buying two satellites, one GEO telecommunications satellite and one Earth-observation 
satellite. Colombian companies currently contract with INTELSAT to provide satellite 
telecommunications services.384 In 2009, Colombia released a call for bids to build 
Satélite Colombia (Colombian Satellite, or SatCol). The only company that placed a bid, 
the Reshetnev Company from Russia, failed to meet the requirements.385 In 2010, 
Colombia also rejected a proposal from the CGWIC. Colombia abandoned efforts to 
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http://www.kosmotras.ru/en/news/23/. 
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procure SatCol in 2011 in favor of a project to modernize Colombia’s 
telecommunications with fiber optics.386  
The FAC’s efforts to procure Satélite de Observación de la Tierra Colombiano 
(Colombian Earth-observing Satellite, or SotCol) have also hit similar snags. In 
September of 2014, the current Vice-President of Colombia, Germán Vargas Lleras, 
announced that Colombia no longer has plans to procure SotCol. According to 
government estimates, Colombia spends about US$11.5 million dollars on satellite data. 
Given the 7-year lifespan of the proposed satellite, Colombia would not recoup the cost 
of a US$250 million satellite in that time.387  
The CCE functions as a governmental coordination body on space policy and 
research, thus it is classified as level one on the Space Technology Ladder. In 2011, the 
CCE released a white paper proposing a Colombian space agency, but no further action 
has been taken.388 Since the university required assistance outside Colombia for 
acceptance testing, Colombia’s efforts with Libertad-1 meet the description for level five 
of the Space Technology Ladder; however, CubeSats are much less complex than larger 
LEO satellites. Colombia has no plans to procure a GEO satellite or launch capability. 
C. ECUADOR 
Like Brazil and Chile, Ecuador served as part of NASA’s early satellite tracking 
network. In 1957, NASA established a tracking station in Cotopaxi, Ecuador and 
remained active until 1982. During this period Ecuador, through the Engineering Services 
Company (ESCO) supported manned spaceflight operations to the second flight of Space 
Shuttle Colombia.389 NASA formally transferred control of the station to Ecuador in 
                                                 
386 Ibid. 
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1984.390 After the handover, ESCO supported Ecuador’s Centro de Levantamientos 
Integrados de Recursos Naturales por Sensores Remotos (Center for National Resource 
Extraction by Remote Sensing, CLIRSEN), which in turn supported the private 
petroleum industry in Ecuador.391 On 19 July 2012, CLIRSEN became the Instituto 
Espacial Equtoriano (Ecuadorian Space Institute [IEE]), a military technical school 
similar to Brazil’s IAE.392 As in Brazil, the Fuerza Aérea Ecuatoriana (Ecuadorian Air 
Force [FAE]) plays a strong role in Ecuador’s space program. 
 Ecuador’s space program centers on Ronnie Nader Bello, a long-time space 
enthusiast and wholly unaffiliated with CLIRSEN or IEE. In 2006, Space Adventures, 
Ltd. announced that Nader reserved a suborbital flight through the company. This 
announcement has since been removed from the company website, but it was captured on 
a space enthusiast forum.393 It is not know how this flight was to be funded. In 
conjunction with this flight, Nader Bello completed suborbital cosmonaut training at the 
Gagarin Cosmonaut training center in Russia; however, as of this writing, he has yet to 
complete his flight. Upon completion of this training, Nader Bello returned to Ecuador 
and, with the support of the FAE, founded the Agencia Espacial Civil Ecuatoriana 
(Ecuadorian Civilian Space Agency [EXA]) in 2007. EXA is a private non-profit 
company, owned in part by the FAE. The FAE also owns Ecuador’s national airline 
TAME..394 
 EXA’s lofty goals will not be realized before its mandate expires in 2019. EXA 
envisioned a three-phase program beginning with unmanned and manned suborbital 
flights, followed by an orbital flight to the ISS, and ending with a manned mission to the 
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moon.395 Even though these goals are far beyond Ecuador’s ability to fund and execute, 
EXA has been successful in its educational outreach programs. EXA built a satellite 
ground tracking station and developed a server that allows researchers all over the world 
to communicate with their satellites when in range of Ecuador. Researchers from the 
University of Michigan were among its first users.396 
Since its foundation, EXA has been involved in a variety of projects. In 
conjunction with the FAE, EXA conducts experiments in microgravity aboard a 
converted T-39 Saberliner donated by the FAE and designated Fuerza-G Uno Cóndor.397 
Currently, Nader Bello’s son, Jules, holds the Guinness World Record for the youngest 
human to experience microgravity—he was seven-years old at the time.398 Nader Bello 
and a team of four other engineers designed and fabricated Ecuador’s first satellite, Navio 
Espacial Ecuatoriano-1 Pegaso (Ecuadorian Spacship-1 Pegasus, NEE-1). NEE-1 also 
used the CubeSat architecture. The total costs of the project from design to launch cost 
roughly US$780,000. Ecuador provided US$700,000; the rest came from private 
donations.399 The satellite successfully launched from the Jiuquan Satellite Launch 
Center in China on 25 April 2013. The satellite carried radio beacons as well as a video 
camera, which successfully transmitted images to EXA’s ground station. 
On 25 May 2013, Pegaso passed through the debris field of a Cyclone-3 upper 
stage launched in 1985. After the encounter, the ground team could no longer receive the 
satellite’s transmissions or send commands, leading them to believe the satellite was 
tumbling. Argentina’s CubeBug-1 was a fellow passenger on the flight and also reported 
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an anomaly.400 On 21 November 2013, Ecuador’s second satellite NEE-2 Krysaor, nearly 
identical to Pegaso, launched successfully from the Dombarovsky Cosmodrome aboard a 
Russian Dnepr rocket.401 Not only did Krysaor function properly, on 27 January 2014 
Krysaor detected the transmissions from Pegaso allowing ground controllers to recover 
the satellite.402 
EXA challenges the definition of a space agency provided by Wood and Weigel. 
On one hand, EXA participates in space research and successfully developed two small 
satellites. On the other hand, EXA does not have the national political standing implied 
by Wood and Weigel. Consequently, this thesis does not classify EXA as a government 
space office or a national space program. While EXA has succeeded in several technical 
endeavors, EXA does not direct the formulation of space policy for the Ecuadorian 
government. This thesis does, however, credit Ecuador as having achieved level five on 
the Space Technology Ladder, given the strong financial support it receives from the 
FAE and the fact that Ecuador has embraced the accomplishments of EXA as its own. 
Although EXA carried out all the design and fabrication in house, it relied on labs in 
Holland to perform the acceptance testing, thus the effort resembles Colombia’s effort 
with Libertad-1.403 Ecuador continues its educational outreach program but has not yet 
announced any new projects. 
D. URUGUAY 
On 5 August 1975, Uruguay established the Centro de Investigación y Difusión 
Aeronaútico Espacial (Aerospace Research Dissemination Center [CIDA-E]), which to 
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this day focuses on space policy and promoting peaceful global norms in space.404 In 
1996, Uruguay hosted the third Conferencia Espacial de las Américas (Space Conference 
of the Americas). The second declaration from this conference encapsulates Uruguay’s 
international orientation in space: “Reiterates and reaffirms the importance of continuing 
progress in the elaboration of norms that contribute to the development of international 
space law.”405 Uruguay epitomizes the constructivist approach to space. 
In 2007, Uruguay’s Universidad de la República began a collaboration with 
Antel, Uruguay’s telecommunications company, to develop a small technology 
demonstrator satellite. AntelSat measures 20 x 10 x 10 centimeters and contains 
electronics for VHF, UHF, S-band communications, and a small camera payload. The 
satellite itself was one of 3 small satellite payloads aboard the Italian Unisat-6, which 
deployed AntelSat on orbit. Unisat-6 and several other payloads were successfully 
launched aboard a Russian Dnepr rocket from the Dombarovsky Cosmodrome on 21 June 
2014.406 
According to the definition given by Wood and Weigel, Uruguay does not have a 
space agency; rather, CIDA-E is classified as a government space office. Like Colombia, 
Uruguay’s efforts with AntelSat meet the description for level five of the technology 
ladder, with the caveat that the system was a CubeSat. Uruguay has not procured its own 
GEO satellite. Uruguay contracts its satellite telecommunications through Intelsat. In 
2006, Uruguay agreed to cede its geostationary orbital slot to Venezuela in exchange for 
a 10 percent usage share in VENESAT-1.407 Finally, Uruguay has no plans to develop 
launch capabilities. 
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Sputnik à Missão Centenário, edited by Othon Cabo Winter and Antonio 
Fernando Bertachini de Almeida Prado, 124–50. São Paulo, Brazil: Editora 
Livraria da Física, 2007. 
Moraes Jr., Paulo. “An Overview of the Brazilian Launch Vehicle Program Cruzeiro Do 
Sul.” American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, 2006. 
doi:10.2514/6.IAC-06-D2.1.08. 
Muñoz, Sara Schaefer, and Ezequiel Minaya. “Venezuela Vulnerable to Oil’s Fall.” Wall 
Street Journal, October 17, 2014, sec. World. 
http://online.wsj.com/articles/venezuela-vulnerable-to-oils-fall-1413540003. 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration. “Internship Information - NASA OEID 
LaunchPad,” November 25, 2014. https://intern.nasa.gov/non-us-
opportunities/index.html. 
 128 
———. “NESC Provides Support to Trapped Chilean Miners.” February 15, 2011. 
http://www.nasa.gov/offices/nesc/home/Feature_Chilean_Miner_Rescue_Support
.html. 
Neuman, Stephanie G. “International Relations and the Third World: An Oxymoron?” In 
International Relations Theory and the Third World, edited by Stephanie G. 
Neuman, 1st ed., 1–29. New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press, 1998. 
Newberry, Robert D. “Latin American Countries with Space Programs: Colleagues or 
Competitors?” Air and Space Power Journal 17, no. 3 (Fall 2003): 39–48. 
http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj03/fal03/newberry.html. 
Nosolosig. “Perú Compra Satélite de Observación Envuelto En Polémica [Peru’s 
Observation Satellite Enveloped in a Polemic]].” April 24, 2014. 
http://www.nosolosig.com/noticias/310-peru-compra-satelite-de-observacion-
envuelto-en-polemica. 
Nuclear Threat Initiative. “Conference on Disarmament (CD).” Accessed December 12, 
2014. http://www.nti.org/treaties-and-regimes/conference-on-disarmament/. 
OECD. The Space Economy at a Glance 2011. Paris, France: OECD Publishing, 2011. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264111790-en. 
———. The Space Economy at a Glance 2014. Paris, France: OECD Publishing, 2014. 
http://public.eblib.com/choice/PublicFullRecord.aspx?p=1870780. 
Oene, Jacques Edwin van. “Space Adventures to Launch First Ecuadorian to Space.” 
NASASpaceflight.com, August 25, 2006. 
http://forum.nasaspaceflight.com/index.php?topic=4018.0. 
Pérez Benitez, Luis A. “Agencia Espacial Mexicana, ¿a Coahuila? [Mexican Space 
Agency, To Coahuila?].” Infoespacial.com, February 23, 2011. 
http://www.infoespacial.com/?perspectiva=agencia-espacial-mexicana-
%C2%BFa-coahuila. 
Pew Research Center. Brazilian Discontent Ahead of World Cup. Washington, D.C.: Pew 
Research Center, 2014. 
Pion-Berlin, David S. “Political Management of the Military in Latin America.” Military 
Review 85, no. 1 (February 2005): 19–31. 
Pion-Berlin, David, and Harold Trinkunas. “Attention Deficits: Why Politicians Ignore 
Defense Policy in Latin America.” Latin American Research Review 42, no. 3 
(January 1, 2007): 76–100. http://www.jstor.org/stable/4499390. 
Pontes, Marcos Cesar. “O Brasil na Estação Espacial Internacional - ISS [Brasil in the 
International Space Station].” In A Conquista do Espaço do Sputnik à Missão 
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